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CONSUMER HARM ACTS?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
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Jason S. Johnston
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Abstract
State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to protect consumers from
unfair and deceptive practices that would not be redressed but for the existence of the acts. In this sense,
CPAs were designed to fill existing gaps in market, legal and regulatory protections of consumers. CPAs
were designed to solve two simple economic problems: 1) individual consumers often do not have the
incentive or means to pursue individual claims against mass marketers who engage in unfair and
deceptive practices; and, 2) because of the difficulty of establishing elements of either common law fraud
or breach of promise, those actions alone are too weak an instrument to deter seller fraud and deception.
The most striking lesson of our analysis is that the typical state CPA – with relaxed rules for establishing
liability, statutory damages, damage multipliers, attorneys fees and costs, and class actions – solves the
basic economic problem that CPAs were intended to address several times over. The effect of this
redundancy in solutions is that CPAs can deter the provision of valuable information to consumers and,
thus, harm consumers. That is, as currently applied state Consumer Protection Acts harm consumers.
This need not be the case. A few modest reforms would dramatically improve the impact of CPAs on
consumer welfare.
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CONSUMER HARM ACTS?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
Henry N. Butler* and Jason S. Johnston**
I. INTRODUCTION
State consumer protection acts (CPAs) were adopted in the 1960s
and 1970s to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices that
would not be redressed but for the existence of the acts.1 In this sense,
CPAs were designed to fill existing gaps in market, common law, and
regulatory protections of consumers. 2 Of particular concern was the lack
of incentive for individual consumers to pursue small claims that were
uneconomical because of the costs of litigation under the common law.
To create an incentive for private enforcement as a tool of consumer
protection, state CPAs deliberately opened the courthouse doors: as a
general rule, state CPAs provide for attorneys fees, authorize or at least
allow class actions, grant expansive remedies (often including statutory
minimum damages, treble damages, and punitive damages), adopt a very
broad and open-ended substantive prohibition of “false, unfair and
deceptive” selling practices, and – in some states – even dispense with
the requirement that a plaintiff plead and prove that she was injured by
* Executive Director, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth,
and Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law.
** Robert G. Fuller Jr. Professor of Law and Director, Program on Law, the
Environment, and the Economy, University of Pennsylvania School of Law.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Case Western Reserve University,
Harvard, and the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics
Association at Columbia. The authors thank participants at those seminars, as well as
Steven Shavell, Joshua Wright, and Samatha Zyontz, for helpful comments. The
authors also thank Elise Nelson, Fern Richardson English, Adam Luetto, and Jonathan
Hillel for valuable research assistance.
1
See Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Law: A Guide for Those Who Represent
Sellers, Lenders, and Consumers 64 (1995).
2
But see Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law,
7 Chapman L. Rev. 155, 156 (“While unknown before the 1970s, modern ‘consumer
law’ does not govern a single transaction that is not also covered by traditional common
law doctrines. However, where tort law required an actual injury as an essential
element of a cause of action; consumer law dispenses with that requirement and others
like it, such as inducement and detrimental reliance. Where the common law matched
the seller’s duty to steer clear of fraud and misrepresentation with the contractual
principle of ‘buyer beware,’ consumer law substitutes a unilateral duty of disclosure on
the seller.”).
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such practices.
Given the promise of expansive awards made under a relaxed
liability standard offered by state CPAs, it is hardly shocking that private
actions under state CPAs have become one of the great growth areas of
American litigation. Over the period 2000-2007, all reported decisions
involving a state CPA claim in state appellate courts increased by over
43%, while those decided in federal courts almost tripled. 3 According to
leaders of the tort reform movement, this massive upsurge in state CPA
litigation does not reflect some new wave of false and deceptive
consumer marketing practices, but rather a tide of at best highly doubtful
claims brought by private class action attorneys seeking a big payday, a
tide of litigation that is symptomatic of the broader litigation crisis. 4
One such case has indeed achieved worldwide notoriety: the $54 million
action under the District of Columbia CPA brought in 2006 by a (then)
administrative law judge against a dry cleaner for losing a pair of pants. 5
To some commentators, the upsurge in CPA litigation is not only
of little concern, but is actually a sign that state CPA laws are succeeding
in their stated goal of protecting consumers. One leading consumer
advocate, for example, has described CPAs as “popular,” 6 and even
suggested that the reasoning and interpretation of state CPAs should be
applied more broadly to expand the common law’s understanding of
fraud. 7 On the other extreme, a leading law and economics scholar has
questioned the need for any form of CPA liability, arguing that
consumers do not need the kind of specific information about products
that consumer advocates demand that sellers to disclose, and that market
forces such as a seller’s desire to acquire and maintain a reputation for
honesty and quality sufficiently discipline and drive out false and

3

Searle Civil Justice Institute, State Consumer Protection Act Pilot Study 17 (draft
of March 10, 2009). As this study notes, id at n. 47, the increase in federal court state
CPA actions accelerated in 2005, when the Class Action Fairness Act pushed many
class actions into federal court.
4
See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Private Consumer Protection
Lawsuit Abuse: When Claims are Driven by Profit-driven Lawyers And Interest-Group
Agendas, Not The Benefit of Consumers (2006).
5
D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. The case, Docket No. 05-CA-4302B, was
dismissed. Chris Conway, Determining Who’s Gotten Satisfaction, N.Y. Times 42
(July 1, 2007) (available at 2007 WLNR 12516195).
6
Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers:
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud,
48 Ariz. L. Rev. 829, 832.
7
Braucher, supra note 3, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. at 830.
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deceptive selling practices. 8
In this Article, we develop and support an intermediate position,
taken by some leading tort reform advocates, that state CPAs can serve a
very useful and indeed economically justified role in supplementing the
protection offered to consumers by the market, the common law, and
federal consumer protection regulation, but only if those statutes are
reformed and sensibly interpreted by the courts. 9 We apply the tools of
economic analysis to identify where state CPA law, as currently
interpreted by the courts, has probably gone wrong from the point of
view of optimally deterring socially undesirable deceptive selling
practices, and we recommend changes in both statutory structure and
judicial interpretation that will make state CPAs an instrument of market
efficiency, rather than a source of inefficient and socially harmful
litigation.
Part II provides an overview of state CPAs in which we identify
the two economically crucial features of the current CPA landscape:
statutory provisions that have created a process that offers enormous
potential rewards even to very dubious lawsuits that are brought often
simply to secure a settlement; and a vague substantive standard of
liability that has been interpreted so expansively by the courts that even
the most seemingly straightforward and informative marketing practices
and communications can trigger potential CPA liability. Part II also
develops an economic framework in which we analyze the impact of
these two crucial features of state CPA law on seller behavior. As we
argue, state CPA law as currently configured is likely to significantly
over-deter the targeted practices. The CPA liability regime likely often
attaches liability even to socially desirable selling practices, and thereby
creates an incentive for sellers to withhold socially valuable information
from consumers. But as sellers may incur liability under state CPAs
8

See Student Blogger, The Myths of Consumer Protection Law, February 26,
2009, available at http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/the-myths-ofconsumer-protection-law.html (summarizing annual Ronald H. Coase lecture delivered
by Professor Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago Law School).
9
See Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (hereinafter Schwartz &
Silverman). The current controversy has arisen in the absence of significant changes in
most state CPAs. Indeed, most CPAs were not controversial during the first twenty
years. However, the potential for problematic applications of CPAs was recognized
earlier. See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer and Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521, 534 (1979-1980).
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both by saying too much and saying too little, the most certain economic
impact of overly expansive state CPA liability may be to effectively
impose an excise tax on every sale of a consumer good or service, thus
increasing prices and lessening consumer welfare, all with no benefit in
terms of deterring socially undesirable seller behavior.
In Part III, we situate state CPA liability within the broader
landscape of institutions for consumer protection. These institutions
include the market, the common law, and federal consumer protection
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission. We analyze how the
market, as supplemented by the common law of fraud and warranties,
does indeed provide significant checks against deceptive consumer
selling practices and advertising. 10 However, we note two serious
shortcomings – from the point of view of optimal deterrence –in the
market/common law regime: imperfect determination of liability, and
costs of liability determination that are disproportionate to the loss
suffered by an individual consumer. These shortcomings of the
market/common law regime provide an economic justification for
regulation (either federal or state) that balances the benefits and costs of
such intervention. However, as we explain, as currently implemented,
state CPA liability is likely to actually weaken the incentives against
consumer deception provided by the market and common law.
The Federal Trade Commission now enforces the FTC Act’s
prohibition of “false, unfair and deceptive” practices under guidelines for
deceptive and unfair practices which seek to balance the costs and
benefits of regulation. 11 The FTC’s consumer protection mission is
guided by a consumer welfare standard. 12 However, enforcement of
state CPAs through private litigation rarely reflects the economic
10

On market forces for consumer protection, see generally Gillian K. Hadfield,
Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock, Information-based Principles for Rethinking
Consumer Protection Policy, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131 (1998).
11
See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy, George Mason University School of
Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, available at Social Science Research
Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182; and J.
Howard Beales III, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority, Its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection (May 30, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/unfair0603.shtm.
12
Despite early jurisprudential and academic uncertainty as to the intended purpose
of the federal antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has adopted the majority position that
consumer welfare is the central policy underlying the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts.
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust
Paradox 51 (2d ed. 1993), and Charles J. Goetz & Fred S. McChesney, Antirust Law:
Interpretation and Implementation 51-52 (3rd ed. 2006).
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sophistication of the FTC in implementing the consumer welfare
standard. For this reason, we conclude that whatever may be the
shortcomings of consumer protection regulatory enforcement by the
FTC, state CPAs as currently structured and interpreted have encouraged
private actions that go far beyond what is necessary to optimally
supplement the FTC enforcement regime.
Part IV sets out the implications of our analysis for the reform of
state CPAs and their interpretation by the courts. First, courts and
legislatures should recognize that many provisions of CPAs are
redundant. Many CPA provisions are designed to make it easier and
more economical for individual consumers to recover for losses, yet
many of these provisions are not necessary to give plaintiffs adequate
incentives with consumer class actions. Thus, courts and legislatures
should recognize the fundamental differences between the two types of
actions. Second, just as a common law plaintiff must show reliance,
causation and harm, so too should consumer protection class action
plaintiffs be required to plead and prove these basic elements. Third,
private class actions should be required, as a threshold matter, to satisfy a
consumer welfare standard akin to that under which the FTC operates in
enforcing the FTC Act. In applying a consumer welfare standard to
CPAs, state courts could rely on FTC interpretations for guidance.
Finally, consumer welfare would be enhanced if legislatures amended
their CPAs to limit the scope of private actions to those that satisfy a
consumer welfare standard.
II. NO HARM, NO FAULT, YET MASSIVE POTENTIAL
LIABILITY: THE STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE
OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
CPAs have recently received harsh criticism by business groups
and tort reform advocates. 13 The core of this critique is that the broad
language of state CPA statutes and liberal judicial interpretations have
led to massive amounts of litigation, disproportionately large damage
awards and settlements for unharmed plaintiffs, and overcompensation
for plaintiff’s attorneys. Later in the paper, we provide an economic
foundation for this critique. But to do so, we must first set out the salient
13

See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Private Consumer Protection
Lawsuit Abuse: When Claims are Driven by Profit-driven Lawyers And Interest-Group
Agendas, Not The Benefit of Consumers (2006).
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structural features of state CPAs. The first set of features are statutory
provisions that have the general effect of opening the courthouse doors
to private CPA lawsuits. These might be called procedural. The second
vital aspect of CPA litigation is substantive, and has to do with the way
that courts have interpreted the generally vague statutory CPA
prohibition of “false and deceptive” practices so as to allow even the
most
seemingly
straightforwardly
informative
marketing
communications to trigger potential CPA liability.
A.
Historical Background and Purpose of State Consumer
Protection Acts
Every state in the nation has some kind of state consumer
protection statute, and many have more than one statutory framework for
consumer protection. About thirty states have in place legislation that
tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or Uniform Consumer
Sales Practice Acts. 14 These laws typically have rather long and detailed
lists of prohibited practices (such as advertising goods with the intent not
to sell them as advertised). 15 Nine states have “consumer fraud” statutes
that make unlawful broad categories of acts including “fraud,”
“deception” and “false promise” in the “sale or advertisement” of goods
when done with an “intent that others rely” upon the act. 16 Finally,
encouraged by the Federal Trade Commission, and in tune with the
explosive growth of federal regulation during the 1970s, “Little FTC
Acts” 17 – which typically contain identical language to the FTC Act
forbidding “unfair competition and deceptive acts and practices” – were
adopted in every state by 1981. 18 These statutes are typically very short,
broadly prohibiting conduct that is “false or deceptive” and granting
private parties very broad standing to sue. 19 Importantly, these statutes
often overlap. California, for example, has both an Unfair Competition
14

Alan S. Brown and Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes
Across the Fifty States, 55 FDCC Quarterly 263, 266 (2005).
15
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 266267.
16
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 268.
17
Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 446 (1991).
18
Id.
19
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 269.
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, for example, prohibits “any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or
misleading advertising.”
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Law 20 modeled after the FTC Act and an Unfair Practices Act 21 that
tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
There is a long list of public interest reasons 22 for the adoption of
CPAs, 23 including:
1. The costs for individual consumers to litigate these matters in
state courts were often prohibitive;
2. Difficulty for consumers to prevail in state common law actions
for fraud, misrepresentation and warranty, as discussed above;
3. Disparity in bargaining power between consumer and businesses;
4. Neither the federal government nor the states could enforce all
actions, so private attorneys general – empowered by the ability
to recover costs, attorney fees and multiple damages – were
necessary to supplement the public enforcement actions; and
5. Private enforcement actions may be necessary to carry out the
legislative intent when pro-business (or anti-consumer) interest
groups control the executive branch. 24
In spite of the role of the FTC in encouraging the adoption of
CPAs, there are major differences between the FTC Act and state CPAs.
These differences indeed define the economically crucial features of
state CPAs.
B. Opening the Courthouse to Private Suits: Procedural Provisions
of State CPA Laws
As a general matter, relative to both the common law and other
default rules of procedure, state CPA statutes effect a remarkable
expansion in the private ability to sue.
20

Cal. Civ. Code §17200 et. seq.
Cal. Civ. Code §1770 et. seq.
22
The enactment of CPAs is often described in terms of a logical gap filling made
necessary by the inability of the common law to deal with problems of a mass marketed
national economy. Such public interest rhetoric should be met with skepticism.
Perhaps the intent of CPAs should be inferred from their effect. Attorneys who file
actions on behalf of consumers are vocal opponents of reform efforts. However, the
fact that they expect to be losers if CPAs are reformed does not demonstrate that they
were the intended winners when the acts were passed. Regardless, even if the CPAs
had a more benign intent, it is clear that they have created interest groups in their wake.
23
See, e.g., Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer
Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (2006).
24
This argument is similar to the argument used for private actions under state and
federal environment statutes.
21
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1. Broad Private Standing to Sue with No Injury or Causation
Requirement
The majority of state CPA’s can be enforced both by the state
Attorney General and by private plaintiffs. 25 While in many states, a
private CPA plaintiff must prove that she suffered injury as a result of
the statutory violation – the false or deceptive practice – in others, the
plaintiff may prevail simply by showing that the act or practice was
likely to be misleading or had a tendency to deceive consumers. 26 Many
courts have interpreted the damage requirements of their state’s statute to
be a very low standard that is easily met. 27 Some states even allow an
admittedly non-injured person to bring a suit on behalf of the general
public or on behalf of other consumers.
Several courts have adopted a broad definition of injury that is
per se satisfied on the occurrence of a misrepresentation. For example,
in Aspinall v. Philip Morris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated
“We reject the proposition that the purchase of an intentionally falsely
represented product cannot be, by itself, an ascertainable injury under
Consistent with this broad
our consumer protection statute.” 28
interpretation, the Massachusetts court also dispensed with the traditional
reliance requirement, stating “[a] successful action based on deceptive
acts or practices does not require proof that the plaintiff relied on the
representation.” 29
Although a seeming countervailing force to the “no injury” cases
can be found in the expansion of the economic loss rule to state CPAs,
there has not been strong advocacy of application of the doctrine. 30 For
example, Professor Braucher identifies the case of Werwinski v. Ford
Motor Co. where the Third Circuit applied the economic loss rule to
25

Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 270,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __. Only Iowa relies exclusively on its attorney general to enforce the
state’s consumer protection laws. See Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales,
Inc., 578 N.W.2d. 222, 227-28 (Iowa 1998).
26
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 272,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
27
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 4, at 22..
28
Aspinall v. Philip Morris, 813 N.E.2d at 486 (MA 2005).
29
Id. at 486.
30
Ellen M. Bublic, Economic Torts: Gains In Understanding Losses, 48 Ariz. L.
Rev. 693, 700 (2006)
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Pennsylvania’s CPA, yet subsequent Pennsylvania state and district
courts refuse to follow the holding. 31 The disparate outcomes in
Pennsylvania are indicative of the courts’ ability to expand the economic
loss doctrine or not in this unsettled part of the law.
Hence under many state CPA statutes, a private party can bring
suit in a purely private attorney general role, alleging only that certain
practices were likely to harm the general consuming public, without any
requirement of proving actual injury or causation. people who may have
been harmed. 32 This private enforcement is a substitute for
administrative enforcement, and it is often suggested that private
enforcement is relied upon because states do not adequately fund
consumer protection agencies. 33 This assertion begs the question of why
state legislatures do not provide adequate funding. Regardless, private
actions under CPAs often do not require a public interest impact as is
required of the FTC under the FTC Act. 34
2. Potentially Expansive Remedies
The remedy available to a successful CPA plaintiff varies greatly,
not only across the states but also across different types of state CPA.
Under California’s Unfair Competition Law, and the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act of several other states, only equitable relief is
available. 35 Equitable relief, however, includes not only injunctions but
also restitutionary, restorative money awards, and, at least in California,
restitution is “not limited to the return of money or property that was
once in the possession of the person,” but is “broad enough to allow a
31

Braucher, supra note , at 848, citing Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.,
357 F.3d 392, 400, 401 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).
32
See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001); and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1113 (2004).
33
See, Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 448 (1991) (“State
and local consumer agencies lack sufficient resources to pursue every consumer fraud
vigorously, and so, like the FTC, face strong incentives to confine their activities to
cases likely to have a broad impact. To plug the holes in consumer fraud enforcement,
nearly every state has now extended to injured consumers the power to sue merchants
who engage in deceptive practices.”).
34
Braucher, supra note 3, at n. 1. See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000) (requiring the
Commission to find that bringing an action in federal court to enjoin a violation of the
FTC Act is in the public interest).
35
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 277,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
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plaintiff to recover money or property in which he or she has a vested
interest.” 36
In a few other states, a CPA plaintiff’s remedies are limited to the
recovery of actual damages. 37 Much more commonly, however, state
CPAs give the option of choosing the greater of actual or statutory
damages. Generally, these statutory damages are in the range of $100 to
$500, but in New Hampshire they are $1000 and in Kansas $5000, while
for flagrant or repeated violations in Idaho, the plaintiff’s statutory
damages are $1000 plus punitive damages. 38
In addition to statutory damages, state CPAs that allow plaintiffs
to recover actual damages also typically authorize the recovery of treble
damages. 39 About two-thirds of state laws provide for treble damages to
punish a defendant for wrongful conduct. 40 Several states double or
treble damages regardless of the egregiousness of the defendant’s
conduct 41 and in another nine states treble damages are available if the
defendant acted intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith. 42 In
New Jersey and Ohio, and under California’s Deceptive Practices Act,
treble damages are actually mandatory. 43 And in Colorado, the District
of Columbia and Hawaii, the plaintiff can choose the greater of treble
damages or statutory damages. 44
36

Juarez v. Arcadia Fin, Ltd., 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 382, 400 (2007). See also Lozano v.
AT&T Wireless Services Inc., 504 F.3d 718, __ (9th Cir. 2007)
37
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 278,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
38
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 278279 Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
Acts, supra note __ at __.
39
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 280281 Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
Acts, supra note __ at __.
40
See generally, Schwartz, supra, note 2.
41
See Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(a) (2004); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k) (2001);
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-13 (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 (2001); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 75-16 (2003); Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (2004).
42
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(c) (2000);
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10 (1995); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 57-12-10(B); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a)
(1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (2001); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-204(A); Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(1) (2002).
43
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 280,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
44
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 281,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
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Consistently with treble damage provisions, most states have
CPAs that at least permit punitive damages. 45 Many state CPAs require
that in order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must show a
heightened level of fault, such as a showing of malicious or aggravated
fraud. 46 Still other state CPAs cap punitive damages. 47
3. Class Actions and Attorney’s Fees
While some state CPAs explicitly prohibit class actions, the laws
of at least fourteen states and those of the District Columbia expressly
permit class actions. 48 State CPAs modeled after the FTC Act are silent
on the availability of class actions, but courts have commonly found that
class action relief is available under such statutes. 49
As for attorneys’ fees, state CPAs are a dramatic exception to the
default “American” rule, under which each party bears their own
attorney’s fees. Nearly half the state CPAs require an award of
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff, and there are indeed
only a few states that follow the “American” rule in CPA cases. 50
C. The Economic Consequences of the State CPA Process
Not every state CPA combines every procedural feature just
described. However, the three key features we have highlighted –
relaxed standing for private lawsuits, potentially expansive remedies, and
the availability of class actions and attorney’s fees – combine to greatly
increase the payoff that a private attorney can expect from a CPA lawsuit

45

Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
46
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
47
Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279,
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts,
supra note __ at __.
48
Albeit sometimes with specific limitations on the form of relief that may be
obtained. See Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, supra note __ at 29.
49
Schwartz & Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
Acts, supra note __ at 29.
50
Schwartz & Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
Acts, supra note __ at 26-27.
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relative to some other sort of case. The fundamental economics of
private litigation predicts that the key state CPA procedural features we
have highlighted above will have systematically distorted private
incentives so that CPA lawsuits will be brought that have very little to do
with deterring socially harmful deceptive consumer practices.
Consider first the impact of eliminating or lessening the
requirement that the plaintiff must show injury, reliance and causation –
that she saw or heard the defendant’s communication, and relied upon it
in deciding to buy the defendant’s product. Observe that this means that
the plaintiff need not stand in any particular relationship to the product or
the alleged false or deceptive practice: all she needs to allege is that
some consumers were likely to be misled by the false or deceptive
practice, not that she even saw or heard it. 51 This is a major change in
the law, and a step that the FTC has been unwilling to take. 52 At least
under those state CPAs where class actions are permitted, eliminating the
requirements of injury and reliance (causation), essentially makes
actionable almost any seller communication if that communication is
sent to a large enough number of consumers. This is because state
CPAs almost uniformly authorize attorney’s fees. With the prospect of
51

Unsurprisingly, as the plaintiff need not stand in any particular relationship to a
state CPA defendant, many state courts have held that traditional common law defenses
are not available, including: the statute of frauds, see, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F.
Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (statute of frauds not applicable under Texas
deceptive trade practices act); warranty disclaimers, see, e.g., Attaway v. Tom's Auto
Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 813, 242 S.E.2d 740 (1978); the doctrine of substantial
performance, see, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980) (“A
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of
action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses
encountered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.” at 616); the parol
evidence rule, see, e.g., Teague Motor Co. v. Rowton, 84 Or. App. 72, 733 P.2d 93
(1987) (parol evidence may be used in Oregon consumer protection cases), Weitzel v.
Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (parol evidence may be used in Texas
consumer protection cases), Capp Homes v. Duarto, 617 F.2d 900, 902 n.1 (1st Cir.
1980) (parol evidence may be used in Massachusetts consumer protection cases); the
common law merger doctrine, see generally Note, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger
Doctrine and Parol Evidence Rule in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41
BAYLOR L. REV. 373 (1989); contractual limitations on liability or remedies, see, e.g.,
International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib., 803 F.2d 150, 155-56 (5th Cir.
1986) (contractual limitations inapplicable in suit under Texas “Little FTC Act”),
Corral v. Rolling Protective Service. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 732 P.2d 1260 (1987) (same
under Kansas law), and Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus., 688 S.W.2d 890
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (same under Texas law); and privity of contract requirements, see
generally Note, The DTPA and Privity: Let the Buyer Beware Becomes Let the Buyer
Recover, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 787 (1987).
52
As discussed above, the FTC requires reasonable reliance in its definitions of
both unfair and deceptive practices.
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recovering attorney’s fees for succeeding merely in showing that some
consumers might well have been misled by a challenged practice, the
typical incentive of a class attorney to select cases based at least in part
on the amount of harm suffered by the individual plaintiffs is
significantly weakened. Instead, regardless of whether any consumer
actually suffered harm due to a practice challenged as false or deceptive,
plaintiffs’ attorneys will have an incentive to role the dice and bring class
actions simply on the chance that they might succeed in showing that
some consumers were misled by a particular practice and then be entitled
to attorney’s fees.
This problem is far from theoretical. California’s Unfair
Competition Law provides only equitable remedies and does not permit
the recovery of damages. However, that same law authorizes attorneys
fees and equitable relief, and prior to the passage of reform legislation in
2004, 53 did not require plaintiffs to show that they had suffered injury.
By the time of the 2004 legislative reform, California’s Unfair
Competition Law had acquired national notoriety as breeding litigation
that the State Attorney General himself eventually called
In a mounting cascade of litigation, plaintiffs’
“extortionate.” 54
attorneys had sued defendants large and small, bringing class action suits
based on allegedly deceptive practices that seemingly harmed no one:
against software makers for putting software in boxes that were “too
big,” allegedly tending to deceive consumers into thinking that there
were more than just one or two disks; 55 against auto shops for years-old
technical regulatory violations – such as failure to give a customer a
copy of an estimate – that had not resulted in fines but which were still
recorded on the Bureau of Automotive Repair’s website; 56 against nail
salons for allegedly deceptively using the same bottle of nail polish on
multiple customers, a practice regarded by the State Board of Barbering

53

Proposition 64, passed November 2, 2004, and codified as amendments to
Cal.Civ.Code §17200.
54
See Jonathan D. Glater, California Says State Law Was used as Extortion Tool,
New York Times, April 5, 2003, People of the State of California v. Trevor Law Group,
LLP (Complaint for Injunction, Restitution and Other Equitable Relief, filed __,
available at __).
55
Civil Justice Association of California, Examples of Unfair Competition
Lawsuits
Filed
by
Private
Attorneys,
available
at
www.cjac.org/newsandreserach/prop64/
56
John H. Sullivan, California’s Notorious “17200” – Written by Lewis Carroll,
Adapted by Stephen King? (October 24, 2002), available at [CJAS]. See also Glater,
California Says State Law Was used as Extortion Tool, supra note __.
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and Cosmetology as standard in the industry; 57 against grocery stores for
putting tags with both the actual and suggested retail price on cosmetics,
watches and wallets. 58 According to the California Attorney General,
many such lawsuits reflected a pattern in which plaintiffs’ firms would
file complaints and simultaneously send letters demanding settlements
from the targeted defendants.
After years of criticism of such suits, in November, 2004, the
citizens of California passed by referendum Proposition 64. Proposition
64 amended certain provisions of California’s Unfair Competition Law
and its False Advertising Law by restricting private actions to persons
who had suffered injury in fact. 59 As subsequent judicial opinions have
interpreted it, after Proposition 64, it is no longer possible for a plaintiff
in an Unfair Competition Law claim in California to merely allege that
some consumers would likely have been misled by the defendant’s
marketing practices or advertisements. Instead, a plaintiff must allege
that she in fact relied upon the practice or advertisement and suffered
concrete injury as a result of such reliance.
By adding such a requirement to California CPA law, Proposition
64 has had the clearly salutary effect of making the legal proof of harm
at least relevant to potential liability under that state’s CPA regime.
However, as we show in the Appendix, it remains the case that by
allowing class actions with attorneys fees for successful plaintiffs and
restitutionary recovery that may be very costly to defendants,
California’s CPA still makes it potentially profitable for class action
plaintiff attorneys to bring even lawsuits with a very low probability of
eventual success. In other words, even if Proposition 64 has made it
harder for plaintiffs to succeed – because now they must prove that they
have been injured by the allegedly false or deceptive practice – CPA
57

CFIF,
Shakedown
in
the
‘Golden
State,’
available
at
www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_issues/federal_issues/.
58
From Civil Justice Association of California, Examples of Unfair Competition
Lawsuits
Filed
by
Private
Attorneys,
available
at
www.cjac.org/newsandreserach/prop64/.
59
After Proposition 64, Bus. & Prof. Code §17204 now provides that “[a]ctions for
any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted…by any person who has suffered
injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.”
The corresponding provision of the False Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. Code §17535,
was amended to require that “[a]ctions for injunction under this section may be
prosecuted by…any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of this chapter. Any person may pursue representative claims or
relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of this
section and complies with section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
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actions will be relatively attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys. As we also
show, the incentive for suit would be even greater in a regime that
granted compensatory relief and punitive or treble damages.
From an economic point of view, the problem with state CPAs is
that they were crafted to offset a problem that has largely been dealt with
by other means. As put by a leading consumer law scholar of the little
FTC era, the problem addressed by state CPAs was that:
“Theoretically, of course, most consumers could eventually
address their rights by bringing a lawsuit. But from a practical
standpoint the costs of investigation and litigation bulk very large in
comparison with the damages which might be obtained. Hence,
personal injury litigation is rarely an effective remedy for consumer
injustice under the present rules of the game in most states. “ 60
As we discuss in more detail below, this problem – inadequate
private incentives for suit – is a real one, and it can indeed lead to
underdeterrence of marketing practices that are truly fraudulent and
deceptive (in that they fool consumers into buying things that they would
not buy if they knew their true quality and characteristics). Ironically,
however, during almost precisely the same time period when states were
passing their little FTC Acts – 1967 to 1972 61 -- states were also
following the standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by
promulgating rules authorizing class actions in state court. 62 The class
action procedural device allows the aggregation of precisely the kind of
small consumer claims that would otherwise not be economically viable.
Provided that successful plaintiffs’ attorneys can receive either court
awarded attorneys fees or a share of the total award recovered on behalf
of the class as a whole, by aggregating the small damages suffered by
many plaintiffs into a single recovery fund, the class action itself
provides very strong incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring
60

William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 Admin. L.
Rev. 271, 273 (1970).
61
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 Tulane L.
Rev. 724, 730 (1971).
62
As shown by Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in
Historical Perspective: A Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1500-1501,
1544-1551 (2008) the majority of states adopted a version of Rule 23 between 1966 and
1979. California took the view that class actions had been authorized by its 1872 Field
Code, but follows Rule 23 and Rule 23 caselaw. Only Mississippi and Virginia do not
allow class actions.
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consumer protection suits. That is, to make consumer protection suits
viable and ensure adequate deterrence, there is no need for the statutory
or enhanced – trebled or more general punitive – damages that are found
in a large number of state CPAs.
Under CPAs as currently structured, plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to
reap large expected payouts by pursuing even those CPA suits that have
a very low probability of success. Given the oftentimes very broad
interpretation of “harm” under state CPAs, even a formal requirement
that the plaintiff plead and prove that she was harmed by the defendant’s
conduct does not guarantee that plaintiff actually was made worse off by
virtue of the defendant’s allegedly false or deceptive practice. And, of
course, a plaintiffs’ attorney has no obligation whatsoever to ensure that
the CPA cases she pursues are in the public interest in any sense.
Indeed, studies of private class actions have made it unmistakably clear
that class actions achieve deterrence that would otherwise be lost, but at
a cost – potentially collusive settlements between class attorneys and
defendants that transfer large sums to class attorneys (but relatively little
to actual class members) while letting defendants get off the hook with
total liability that is small relative to the harm they have caused. 63
It is not surprising that class actions under California’s CPA have
come to be perceived as intended merely to induce settlement, rather
than deter truly harmful practices. As Professor George Priest explains:
[A] principal concern regarding the operation of class
actions is that the certification of a class itself, often based
upon satisfaction of relatively undemanding procedural
requirements, will bludgeon a defendant into a massive
settlement. . . . Commentators unanimously concede that
virtually every mass tort class action that have been
successfully certified has settled out of court rather than been
litigated to judgment. . . . We have recently observed
63

See Deborah R. Hensler, e al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for
Private Gain 79-99 (2000) (discussing evidence for, and varieties of such collusive
settlements). Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorney-Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) reviewed
class action awards from 1993 to 2002 and found that the average award was $139
million and that the average award in the top ten percent of awards was $1.08 billion.
There are several reasons to believe that the Eisenberg-Miller numbers underestimate
the true magnitude of class action judgments and settlements. See GEORGE L. PRIEST,
WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON’T KNOW ABOUT MODERN CLASS ACTIONS: A REVIEW OF
THE EISENBURG-MILLER STUDY, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 9
(2005).
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settlements in class actions at enormous sums of money
where there appears to be no substantive basis for defendant
liability. 64
In this unfortunate strategic game – what we call the settlement holdup
game – defendants settle even cases that they would probably win on the
merits. The game is played, successfully, against both large and small
companies. Small companies often settle when they believe they have a
good chance of winning at trial because they cannot risk the potential
loss of their business and everything they own; large firms because
settlements remove the specter of potential liability that depresses market
value. 65
As noted earlier and explained in more detail below, the FTC Act
requires the Commission to consider the public interest (which is now
manifest in the consumer welfare standard) in deciding whether to
challenge a practice as false or deceptive. By contrast, only a few states
attempt to discipline the incentives of private attorneys by including a
public interest requirement for private CPA actions. 66 However opaque
64

GEORGE L. PRIEST, WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON’T KNOW ABOUT MODERN
CLASS ACTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE EISENBURG-MILLER STUDY, MANHATTAN
INSTITUTE CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 9 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
65
See H.R. Rep. No. 106-320, at 8 (1999) (“Too frequently, corporate
decisionmakers are confronted with the implacable arithmetic of the class action: even a
meritless case with only a 5% chance of success at trial must be settled if the complaint
claims hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.” Citing testimony of John L.
McGoldrick, Esq., Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, "Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits" (March 9,
1998).) [add Merck/Vioxx settlement example and refer back to small business UCL
cases].
66
See Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 234 (the practice challenged by an individual under
Colo. Rev. State. § 6-1-113 (1998) must significantly impact the public as actual or
potential consumers); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 84, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915
(1980) (stating that unless the defendant’s actions had or has potential harm for the
consumer public they are not directly regulated by the FBPA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-3-0 et.
seq.); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2000) (public interest must be
demonstrated to state a claim under the private A.G. statute – relating to the CFA,
Minn. Stat. § 325F.68 et. seq.); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258 Neb. 678, 605
N.W.2d 136 (2000) (to be actionable under the CPA the unfair/deception act must have
impact on the public interest); Jefferies v. Phillips, 316 S.C. 523, 451 S.E.2d 21, 1994
S.C. App. Lexis 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (to be actionable under SCUPTA, S.C. Code
§ 39-5-20, unfair or deceptive practices must adversely affect the public interest);
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719
P.2d 531 (1986) (private litigant must establish a public interest impact to establish a
prima facie case under the CPA, Rev. Code Wash. § 19.86.010 et. seq.).
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may be the mix of professional and political concerns that motivate FTC
Commissioners, private attorneys who enforce state CPAs are simply not
bound by the same practical and legislative constraints that apply to FTC
regulators. 67 The great divergence in incentives in filing suit between
private and public law enforcers is strikingly illustrated by California’s
experience with the allegedly extortionate practice engaged in by some
notorious class action firms of suing hundreds or even thousands of
small businesses for technical regulatory violations (e.g. auto shops
sometimes forgetting to give customers copies of their estimates, nail
salons using the same nail polish bottle more than once). As the
regulatory net has become increasingly dense and overwhelming for
business, there are more and more technical regulatory violations that
typically lead to little or no harm. Presumably one reason why the
legislatures of California, and other states, have vested direct regulatory
enforcement authority in public agencies is because those legislatures
trust the agencies to use their discretion in the public interest, refraining
from enforcing against violations that cause de minimus harm and truly
are technical in nature. Private class action attorneys are not guided by
the same principles of discretion, and indeed are incentivized by the
restitutionary remedial schemes and the prospect of recovering attorneys
fees offered by state CPAs to bring CPA actions that are grounded in
precisely the sort of technical regulatory violations that public regulators
would overlook. Such private actions carry with them a very real
likelihood of inefficient over-enforcement: enforcement that is not
justified by the value of deterring the practices that are targeted for
enforcement, because those practices cause little or no harm. 68
D. Expansive Judicial Interpretation of the Concept of “Unfair and
Deceptive” and the Potentially Chilling and Taxing Impact of State
CPA Liability.
Although it is conceivable that the private interests of CPA class
action litigants will further the public interest as if guided by an
67

See, e.g., Sovern, supra, note 20, at 452.
As aptly put by Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic
Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, 1930 (2006), “[a]lthough
the concept of inefficient overenforcement is a tool of economic analysis of law, when
applied to a particular statute, it surely must start with the level of enforcement sought
by the legislature, which may be inferable from the legislature’s attention or inattention
to the background or ancillary rules and institutions that determine the real value of
legal rights.”
68
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“invisible hand,” achievement of such a public interest goal obviously
hinges in large part ultimately on what kinds of practices can trigger
liability under a state CPA. Assuming – as we do throughout this part –
that some form of CPA liability is necessary to supplement common law
and market forces that discipline deceptive and misleading practices in
marketing consumer goods, it remains important that the CPA liability
process effectively focuses liability on truly misleading and deceptive
practices. From the point of view of optimally deterring false and
misleading consumer marketing practices, problems arise both from an
under-inclusive CPA liability regime – one that attaches liability to too
few such practices – and one that is over-inclusive – threatening CPA
liability even for marketing and advertising which is on balance
informative and socially desirable (or at least innocuous).
As currently interpreted by the courts, the problem of overinclusive CPA liability is we believe very real, with potentially seriously
deleterious consequences not only for companies that make and market
consumer products and services but for consumers themselves. In the
FTC Act and “little FTC” acts, both Congress and the state legislatures
left the definitions of “unfair” and “deceptive” vague, but they chose
different paths to determining the meaning of the terms. Congress
empowered the FTC to use its expertise to determine the meaning of
unfair and deceptive, 69 while most state legislatures have chosen to not
have effective administrative agencies to develop expertise in the
definition and enforcement of illegal acts. Instead, state legislatures have
relied on judicial interpretation through private litigation to define the
terms. The FTC has by regulation adopted a method of determining
whether a practice is “false, unfair and deceptive” that takes account of
the costs and benefits of regulatory relief and quite openly seeks to
maximize consumer welfare. 70 State courts are highly unlikely to exhibit
the same degree of expertise in interpreting statutory language as a
specialized federal agency. 71 Yet, many states seem to have ignored this
crucial difference and did not provide the courts – and, perhaps more
importantly, businesses – with needed guidance as to what constitutes an
69

Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)).
70
See discussion infra notes __ to __.
71
See, e.g. Muris, supra note , at 16 (“[A]dministrative agencies, like the FTC,
have developed areas of expertise, such as interpreting implied claims in advertising,
that provide an advantage over courts when ruling on consumer matters involving
certain complex issues.”).
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unfair or deceptive practice. The result of this drafting is a freewheeling
set of interpretations that are difficult to reconcile with consumer
welfare. In section, we provide examples of some such interpretations,
and then explain in more detail the adverse economic consequences from
these interpretations.
1. The Expansive Interpretation of “Unfair and Deceptive”
under State CPA’s
The types of lawsuits filed under state CPAs are the stuff of
newspaper headlines and nightly news stories: former administrative
law judge Roy Pearson Jr.’s $54 million suit – brought under the District
of Columbia CPA – against a family-owned dry cleaning store for losing
his pants, thereby causing its “Satisfaction Guaranteed” sign to constitute
a false and deceptive practice; 72 a suit – also under the District of
Columbia’s CPA -- on behalf of people who consumed milk without
knowing that they were lactose intolerant alleging that it was false and
deceptive for sellers of milk to fail to warn them of the adverse effects
that lactose intolerant people suffer when they drink milk; 73 suits
brought under California’s CPA against auto dealers for technical
regulatory violations, such as using the abbreviation “APR” instead of
“Annual Percentage Rate,”; 74 a suit alleging that a Fresno, California fast
food restaurant engaged in an unfair practice by placing a restroom
mirror an inch higher that is permitted under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act. 75 The allegations in these and many other such suits
depict either trivial regulatory violations, marketing communications that
are very general and imprecise and unlikely to deceive any typical
consumer (“Satisfaction Guaranteed”), or a failure to communicate
information that should be obvious to any consumer who knows his or
her own personal characteristics (that lactose intolerant people will suffer
adverse effects if they drink regular milk). They seem clearly to fall
short of meeting almost any sensible standard of what might constitute a
“false and deceptive” practice.
To their credit, courts have often dismissed such lawsuits on their
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Pearson v. Chung, 961 A.2d 1067 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008).
Mills v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 441 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.C. D.C. 2006).
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ATR, Private Consumer Protection Lawsuit Abuse, supra note __ at 9.
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ATR, Private Consumer Protection Lawsuit Abuse, supra note __ at 9.
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pleadings, refusing to permit plaintiffs to get anywhere near a jury. 76
Yet dismissals of even such seemingly egregious cases are at least
sometimes appealed. 77 And such appeals are far from frivolous, because
it is easy to find cases that are just as far-fetched on their factual
allegations that have survived not only dismissal but appeal. In Johnson
v. Hewlett Packard Co, 78 for example, the plaintiff alleged that HewlettPackard brochures that described its printers as including a free
“economy” ink cartridge were deceptive because the free cartridges
contained only half as much ink as a normal cartridge, forcing consumers
to have to buy replacement cartridges sooner than they expected. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the
company had truthfully disclosed that the free cartridge was an
“economy” cartridge, but the appellate court reversed on the ground that
there was a triable issue of fact over how most buyers would have
understood the phrase “economy cartridge.” 79
Similarly, in one of the most highly publicized recent CPA cases
in California, Benson v. Kwikset Corp, 80 the plaintiff alleged that
although the deadbolts, doorknobs and door handle sets (a category
referred to as “locksets”) sold by Kwikset were assembled in its U.S
plants, because some of Kwiksets products included some screws or pins
made in Taiwan and a latch part made at its plant in Mexico, labels on
Kwikset product stating “Made in U.S.A.” or “All American Made”
constituted an “unlawful” and “unfair” business practice under the
California CPA. 81 This claim made it to a bench trial, where the plaintiff
76

See, e.g., Mills v. Giant of Maryland, and Pearson v. Chung, supra note __. See
also Bivens v. Gallery Corp., 134 Cal. App. 4th 847 (2006)(upholding dismissal of
complaint alleging that a newspaper advertisement for twin matteresses showing a
woman on a mattress, stating a unit price, and also stating both “TWIN EA. PC” and
“SOLD IN SETS ONLY” was misleading because it failed to give the total price for
twin sets.)
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See cases cited supra note 65.
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No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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This description is taken from Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously,
92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 614-615.
80
Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 126 Cal. App. 4th 887 (Ct. App. 2005), as modified on
denial of rehearing 152 Cal. App. 4th 1254 (Ct. App. 2007).
81
In particular, California’s Unfair Competition Law, Civ. Code §§17200 et. seq.
that create a right to restitutionary and injunctive relief against any “unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business practice or practice…” Plaintiff also alleged that such labels
violated a provision of California’s false advertising law that makes in unlawful to sell
products that are labeled with “the words ‘Made in U.S.A.,’ ‘Made in America,’
‘U.S.A.’ or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit, or part thereof, has
been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United
States.”
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presented witnesses who testified that because they interpreted a “Made
in U.S.A.” label to mean that “all of the parts and all of the labor used to
manufacture the product occurred” in the U.S., they felt deceived by the
labels on Kwikset products. 82 The trial judge found that “a lockset
incorporating a latch assembly that was sub-assembled in Mexico is
deceptively labeled with either designation” and that “locksets that
incorporate only a few screws or pins made in Taiwan are not
deceptively labeled with a ‘Made in U.S.A.’ label, but are deceptively
labeled with an ‘All American Made’ label.” 83 The trial court enjoined
Kwikset’s use of the supposedly misleading labels, ordered it to allow
retailers to return the “mislabeled” locksets for either a refund or
replacement, and awarded plaintiff statutorily authorized costs plus
attorney’s fees. 84 Thus although Kwikset might seem to be a case that at
the very least pushes the boundaries of what could reasonably be
considered to be false or misleading mass market consumer
communications, it is a case that the plaintiff actually won.
Although California’s Proposition 64 – establishing an injury
requirement for plaintiffs to establish standing under both California’s
unfair competition and false advertising laws – was passed during the
pendency of the Kwikset, that Proposition seems unlikely to affect the
outcome: after a trial, the judge found that at least one of the labels was
misleading to consumers in general, one of whom the plaintiff could
easily assert himself to be. 85 There is little doubt that Proposition 64 has
been successful to some extent, because there are already a large number
of reported decisions in which Proposition 64’s injury requirement has
led to the early dismissal of many patently frivolous suits that might well
otherwise have proceeded through discovery. 86 Yet in many cases that
seem equally far-fetched, plaintiffs have managed to at least
satisfactorily plead injury, leaving judicial interpretation and
implementation of the substantive standard of “unfair, false and
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deceptive” as the key determinant of whether such claims are dismissed
quickly or instead become the fodder for the class action settlement holdup game described above.
For example, in Paduano v. American Honda Motor Co. 87 , the
plaintiff said that in deciding to purchase a 2004 Honda Civic Hybrid, he
read and relied upon a number of allegedly misleading claims about fuel
economy made in the Hybrid sales brochure. 88 These claims included a
highlighted EPA estimate of 51 mpg for the manual transmission version
of the hybrid, an image of text reading “51 mpg” in large yellow font,
with smaller foreground text beginning “with impressive fuel economy
of 51 mpg,” and statements in the brochure stating “just drive the Hybrid
like you would a conventional car and save on fuel bills,” and “IS
THERE ANYTHING SPECIAL YOU HAVE TO DO? You just have to
love saving money and getting terrific gas mileage.” 89 Since the EPA
estimate for this make and model was indeed 51 mpg, and since the
brochure clearly stated that this was for the manual transmission – not
the automatic that Paduano bought – the trial court had no difficulty in
concluding as a matter of law that there was nothing false or misleading
in Honda’s advertising statements that identified the EPA estimated
mileage. 90 However, the trial court found that there was a triable issue
of fact was raised by Paduano’s assertion that Honda had misled him by
stating that a consumer could achieve the EPA mileage just by “driv[ing]
the Hybrid like…a conventional car.” These fact issues were raised,
according to the trial court, by evidence introduced by Paduano that a
Honda representative told him that the mileage tests used to derive EPA
estimates “were developed over 30 years ago and do not reflect real
driving situations, let alone driving habits of consumers in the modern
day” and that another Honda representative told him that to get the high
advertised fuel efficiency, “one would have to drive a hybrid vehicle in a
manner quite different from the manner in which one would drive a
conventional vehicle.” 91 Remarkably enough, on appeal, the trial court
87
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decision to deny summary judgment was upheld by the majority.
What is most remarkable about the Paduano decision is that it
has apparently been well known for many years that EPA mpg ratings
may systematically overstate the mileage that drivers will obtain, and not
just from hybrids. 92 Moreover, apparently both Honda and Toyota had
become aware – through customer complaints – that their hybrids were
not getting the EPA-estimated mileage and had in fact contacted the EPA
to try to get revised EPA estimates that were more in line with the
mileage that customers were actually reporting. 93 At its most essential
level, the Paduano case got past summary judgment on the strength of
the argument that Honda failed to tell drivers that hybrids were new and
different and that methodology used by the government to get its mileage
estimates would not necessarily be accurate. But as the dissenting
appellate judges (Haller and O’Rourke) in Paduano powerfully argued,
this is far cry from allowing to find that what Honda did say was
misleading or deceptive:
“…the Honda brochure’s assertion as to driving the Hybrid
conventionally and saving on fuel bills is true and basically
definitional. By its nature, a hybrid vehicle ‘saves on fuel’ (i.e.
gasoline) because there are times while driving that the gasoline
engine cuts off. The brochure itself points out that the electric motor
adds its power to the output of the gasoline engine while
accelerating, and also that ‘At a stop, the engine cuts of
automatically under most conditions to reduce fuel use and
emissions, thanks to the idle-stop feature. It restarts itself when
you’re ready to go’ Paduano himself admitted in his deposition that
any car’s gas mileage would decrease with aggressive driving. His
own deposition testimony bolsters the conclusion that Honda’s
suggestion about driving the hybrid Civic like a conventional car is
not likely to mislead a reasonable consumer….the statement ‘just
drive the car like you would a conventional car and save on fuel
bills’ relates not to driving style (aggressive versus non-aggressive
driving) but to the absence of any need to plug the car into an outlet.
in order to be fuel efficient, and short trips penalize hybrid efficiency more so than
regular cars.” Id.
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Nevertheless, the majority’s theory – that the brochure is misleading
because it suggests a person can drive the car in a ‘normal’ or
conventional manner and still get fuel economy close to the EPA
estimate…necessarily depends on plaintiff’s reliance on the
accuracy of the EPA estimates set forth in the brochure. But as the
majority holds, such a claim is not actionable!” 94
2. Economic Consequences of the Highly Uncertain and
Expansive State CPA Substantive Liability Standard
The incentive effects created by state CPA liability are a function
of two things: the probability that such a suit will be brought, and the
relationship between manufacturer/marketer behavior and the probability
of liability given that suit is brought. We argued earlier that, especially
when coupled with the class action procedural device, even CPA suits
with a relatively low probability of success on the merits may be
economically worthwhile for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file. The likelihood
of success on the merits – and, more precisely, how the manufacturer’s
ex ante choices influence its probability of ex post liability – is a
fundamental determinant of the ex ante incentives created by any legal
liability system. In the case of CPAs, liability under the substantive
“unfair and deceptive” standard is likely so expansive and uncertain that
its likely effect is to both chill and tax socially desirable
manufacturer/marketer communication to consumers
In this section, we explain why this is so. To do so, we begin by
recalling some basic results from the law and economics literature on the
incentive effects of alternative types of liability regimes in the classic
tort case, where a potential injurer (car driver, manufacturer) is choosing
how careful to be to reduce the probability of harm. A mass marketer’s
choice about how and what to communicate to consumers is, however,
quite different than the choice of precautions that is the focus of the
canonical law and economics model. We explain how this difference is
likely to lead to a socially undesirable chilling of mass market consumer
communication. Importantly, unlike the generic precautions typically
considered in the canonical economic model of legal incentives, a
consumer product marketer does not necessarily lower its liability by
doing more – by disclosing more, and in greater detail – in its
communication to consumers. For this reason, CPA liability may well
94
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amount to an inescapable but risky tax that accompanies any mass
market consumer communication.
a. The Model of Precautions 95
We begin by reviewing some of the basic law and economics of
tort law incentives. At one extreme, one can imagine an economically
ideal fault-based liability system. Such a system is one in which the
manufacturer would face a 100 percent chance of liability if its behavior
was economically suboptimal, and a 0 percent chance of liability if its
behavior was economically optimal. At the other extreme, one can
imagine a regime of absolute fault, in which the manufacturer is liable
for damages in the event the consumer suffers harm regardless of what
the manufacturer said or did.
One of the early and most fundamental results in law and
economics is that both regimes – economically ideal fault-based liability
and absolute liability – create an incentive for potential injurers to take
optimal care to lower the probability of accidental harm. 96 Essentially,
under either regime, the manufacturer internalizes the full social costs of
its choices if it takes less than optimal care, and so both regimes equate
private and social costs for less than optimal care. The difference
between the two regimes comes in the distribution of the cost of
accidents given optimal care by the manufacturer: under absolute
liability, the manufacturer bears the cost of accidents even if it takes
optimal care, while under ideal fault-based liability, the manufacturer
takes optimal care but, given that choice, is never found liable and so
victims are left bearing their own costs.
These two regimes – ideal fault-based liability and absolute
liability – are highly simplified, theoretical liability regimes. Faultbased liability is not, of course ideal. Rather than a regime in which the
manufacturer perceives 0 chance of liability if it takes optimal care and a
100 percent chance of liability if it fails to take optimal care, the more
realistic situation is likely to be one in which a manufacturer perceives
95
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that there may always be some positive probability of liability, no matter
what it does, but that the probability of liability will fall, the more careful
was its actual ex ante behavior. Such a regime is, from an economic
point of view, imperfect, but it is nonetheless rational, in that the more
careful the ex ante behavior, the lower the chance of ex post liability.
However rational, such a regime creates too strong an incentive for
manufacturer precautions. The reason is that under such a regime, the
manufacturer (or more generally, injurer) gets what is in effect a double
marginal benefit from care-taking: it lowers the probability that a
consumer suffers harm, and it also lowers its chances of being found
liable if such harm occurs. Economic theory predicts that under very
general conditions, this double marginal benefit leads to excessive
This theoretical prediction has, moreover, been
precautions. 97
confirmed by empirical work in the medical malpractice area that has
found evidence that uncertain malpractice liability has caused physicians
to practice defensive medicine: excessive levels of treatment that are
ordered primarily to lower the risk of liability, rather than to improve
patient outcomes. 98
Importantly, such imperfect fault-based liability regimes are quite
similar to strict liability, in that they generally leave a manufacturer
facing some positive probability of liability no matter what its choice.
Like strict liability, therefore, the incentive effects of fault-based liability
regimes are highly sensitive to the damage measure. In an ideal faultbased liability regime, where a manufacturer is sure that it will not be
held liable if it does the “reasonable” thing, the measure of damages is –
in equilibrium – irrelevant, because the manufacturer’s ex ante behavior
is always economically optimal (which is equivalent to legally
“reasonable” in an economically optimal legal regime) and therefore the
manufacturer doesn’t pay damages anyway. But in a more realistic,
imperfect fault-based regime, the manufacturer is generally too careful,
but also generally still faces a positive chance of liability. Hence under
97
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such an imperfect regime, the prospect of paying extraordinary damages
(statutory damages greater than actual harm, double or treble damages,
or punitive damages) will add to the risk of overdeterrence. Only if one
is sure that there is little or no risk that economically reasonable behavior
will be punished with punitive damages can one assume that imposing
punitive damages in an imperfect fault-based regime will not lead to
significant overdeterrence.
b. The Model of Precautions Extended to CPA Liability for
“False” and “Misleading” Selling Practices and Communications
The perceptive reader may well have been asking herself whether
the simple economic model of precautions that we have just described
can be usefully applied to the kind of behavior that subject
manufacturers and other mass consumer marketers to potential liability
under CPAs. After all, the typical CPA case that we described earlier
does not involve the question of whether the defendant mass marketer
took reasonable precautions to lower the risk of a harmful accident, but
rather whether the mass marketer’s communication (or marketing
practices more generally) was “deceptive” or “unfair.” In this section,
we extend the economic analysis of incentives under fault-based liability
regimes to the choices that potentially trigger liability under CPAs.
A wide variety of conduct has the potential to trigger CPA
liability. Here we are interested in two categories of conduct: selling
practices and marketing communications (including advertising). In the
category of selling practices, we place choices such as how big a box in
which to put consumer software, or whether or not to reuse nail polish.
In the category of communications, we place behavior ranging from
simple “Satisfaction Guaranteed” signs to claims about the mpg rating of
a Honda hybrid made in product brochures. Also in the communication
category are included cases where the allegation was not that what was
said was misleading but that too little was said. These cases would
include those such as that where the plaintiffs claimed that milk
producers had violated the District of Columbia CPA by failing to warn
lactose intolerant people of the adverse side effects that they would incur
from drinking milk.
The harm that CPAs seek to avoid occurs when consumers are
deceived or misled into buying products (or services) that are not those
that they believed they were buying. Hence the question when the
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economic model of precautions is applied to the CPA context is how
potential CPA liability influences the incentives of sellers of consumer
products and services to take action to reduce the probability that their
selling practices or communications will cause consumers to be misled.
In the case of selling practices, the kinds of practices that are
amenable to attack under state CPAs seem to be limited only by the
imaginations of class action attorneys. If putting software disks in
boxes and reusing nail polish can be misleading, then it is because of a
background assumption about what consumers are thinking: that there is
not a lot of extra space in a box with software disks (that it is more or
less full or disks) and that every time a nail salon does a customer’s
nails, it is using a new bottle of nail polish. Whether these assumptions
are reasonable reflections of what any consumer actually thinks cannot
be determined ex ante. What we think that cases like these clearly do is
to tell firms that sell consumer products or services that virtually
anything they do could trigger potential CPA liability. If virtually any
selling practice can trigger liability, then there is no particular
“precautionary” selling practice that a seller can adopt to lessen the
chance of liability. If this is so, then the only effective precaution that
can be taken to reduce potential liability for selling practices is to get out
of the business of selling directly to consumers. For firms who stay in
the business of selling to consumers, CPA liability acts like a tax that
accompanies every decision to sell directly to consumers.
Consider next the model of precautions as applied to consumer
communications. Here the problem is that there is potential CPA
liability for saying too much – as about the EPA-estimate mph for Honda
hybrids – and saying too little – as in failing to warn lactose intolerant
people that they will suffer adverse physical effects if they drink milk.
Moreover, there is also potential liability if statements are insufficiently
complete – as in saying that a door knob is “Made in the U.S.A.” when it
contains screws made in Taiwan. The standard case presumed in the
economic model of precautions is one in which by taking more
precautions, the actor lowers the risk of both social harm and that it will
incur private liability. But with CPA liability, firms do not necessarily
lower their liability by saying more in their consumer communications.
Nor do they necessarily lower their liability by saying less, or even by
saying nothing (since there may be a duty to disclose under the CPAs).
Perhaps it is only by making extremely detailed and highly cautionary
disclosures – to the effect that certain consumers may find that the
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product or service is not to their liking, for various and sundry
enumerated reasons – could a seller actually shape its marketing
communications and advertising so as to lower its risk of CPA liability.
The problem confronting a seller who is honestly trying to devise
advertising disclosures that inform but do not mislead consumers is a
hard one: recent studies have shown, for example, that prominently
disclosing one product attribute may reduce consumers’ understanding or
recall of other information disclosed in the very same ad. 99 Consistent
with this evidence from the marketing literature, as we explain in more
detail in the next section, in an economically relevant sense, such highly
qualified and conditional seller communications may actually lessen the
dissemination of useful information to consumers. 100
To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical evidence that
details the extent of such a chilling effect of potential CPA liability on
consumer communications and advertising. However, there are wellknown cases in which CPA liability has had precisely the effect that we
predict. Perhaps the most famous is Nike v. Kasky. 101 In the late 1990’s,
Nike was besieged with accusations that its products were manufactured
in overseas sweatshops. Nike responded with a flurry of press releases,
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letters to the editors and also commissioned a former U.N. ambassador to
write a report on the labor conditions in Nike’s overseas factories. Labor
activist Mark Kasky filed a suit against Nike under California’s Unfair
Competition and False Advertising laws on behalf of the general public,
alleging that Nike’s statements about its treatment of its workers
amounted to a violation of California’s deceptive trade practices law.
Nike argued that the application of these California CPA laws to its
commercial speech infringed the First Amendment. This challenge was
rejected by the California Supreme Court, 102 and although the Supreme
Court of the United States originally took certiorari on the First
Amendment issue, a majority of the Court then changed their minds and
reversed the grant. 103 After this, the case settled, with Nike agreeing to
pay several million dollars to a D.C. based international labor rights nongovernmental organization.
For present purposes, what is most
important about Nike v. Kasky is the immediate chilling impact it had on
Nike’s communications: as soon as the case was filed, Nike stopped
issuing its annual Corporate Social Responsibility reports 104 and making
claims regarding its labor and environmental practices. This selfimposed speech moratorium lasted several years, and when Nike
resumed communications regarding its labor practices, it was careful not
to assert anything about labor conditions, but instead simply posted
online a list with its suppliers’ names and locations. 105
Another example of the chilling effect of potential CPA liability
on communications with consumers is provided by Benson v. Kwikset. 106
As soon as Benson filed his CPA suit in 2000, Kwikset ceased “all use of
the USA designations on their locksets.” 107 As we explain below, when
firms are deterred by CPA liability from communicating information to
consumers, both firms and consumers suffer adverse consequences in the
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form of lost sales that would have generated positive gains from trade for
both.
There is a final impact of potential CPA liability under the
expansive construction of “false and deceptive” that becomes clear when
we recognize that in the case of consumer products and services,
precautions are two-sided. It is not only what the seller says or how it
markets its goods and services that determines what consumers know or
do not know about the product before they buy it; consumers also have
an opportunity to in effect take precautions by becoming informed about
the product or service, about the seller, and about the seller’s reputation
before they make a purchase. There is a fundamental tradeoff between
providing remedies to allegedly deceived consumers and giving
consumers the incentive to investigate and protect themselves. 108 If
consumers expect to be made whole when ill-advised decisions have bad
consequences, then they have less incentive to be reasonably cautious.109
The FTC clearly recognizes these concerns in its definitions of unfair
and deceptive. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to tradeoff costs
and benefits under state CPAs.
c. The Impact of Uncertain CPA Liability on Consumer Welfare
From the previous discussion, there are at least two serious
impacts of expansive and uncertain potential CPA liability on the market
for consumer goods and services: first, the imposition of what is
effectively a tax on every good or service sold to consumers; second, the
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imposition of potential liability for consumer communications and
advertising, liability that may well have the effect of either chilling
informative communication and/or inducing sellers to make such
communications both much more detailed and much more cautionary
and discouraging. In this section, we trace the consequences for
consumer welfare of these two effects.
(i) The Welfare Loss from CPA Liability as an Excise Tax
First, and most simply is the direct impact CPA liability has in
imposing what is essentially an excise tax on each and every consumer
sale. Generally speaking, excise taxes are imposed on luxury goods
(airplanes, boats) and on goods whose consumption the government
wishes to reduce, such as cigarettes. The reason is that excise taxes
increase seller costs, which leads to an increase in price and reduction in
quantity demanded and consumed. In the case of competitive markets,
the excise tax has two consequences for the economic welfare of sellers
and consumers. These consequences are depicted in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 depicts the consequences of imposing expected CPA liability in
the amount L on every sale of a generic good or service.110 As shown by
Figure 1, the market effects of imposing this liability/tax is to reduce the
equilibrium market quantity consumed from Q to QL and to increase the
equilibrium price from P to PL.
[Figure 1 About here]
The first consumer welfare consequence of the CPA liability as
an excise tax is to simply price some consumers out of the market for the
product. Consumers whose willingness to pay is bigger than P but less
than PL are those who would buy the product if expected CPA liability
were not added to its cost, but who will not when CPA liability is
imposed.
The second consequence of CPA liability for consumer welfare is
that consumers are now worse off because they have to bear part of the
price increase due to the increase in seller costs due to CPA liability.
More precisely, consumers who remain in the market and continue to
buy the good are now worse off by an amount equal to the increase in
price (PL - P) multiplied by the quantity consumed with CPA liability
110
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costs, QL. This element of consumer loss depends upon the slope (more
precisely, elasticity) of the demand curve: if demand were perfectly
inelastic (perfectly vertical in Figure 1) – meaning roughly that the good
or service is akin to a necessity without substitutes for a certain category
of consumers – then consumers would bear the entire liability increase.
If demand were perfectly elastic – meaning consumers have no
willingness to pay more than a particular price – there would be no
increase in the prices paid by consumers, but there would still be a
reduction in supply at that price, as only some suppliers could remain in
business.
Since virtually any product or service sold to consumers carries
with it the risk of CPA liability, at least with respect to items for which
consumer demand is in the short run inelastic, it is consumers who are
likely to bear the bulk of the cost of CPA liability, not firms. Especially
for everyday goods and services – for which consumers do not shop out
of state or online – states that have especially egregious CPA liability
regimes are likely to be imposing most of the cost right back on the very
same consumers whose welfare is supposed to be furthered. Moreover,
it is well established in the public finance literature that excise taxes tend
to be regressive – lower income consumers pay a larger portion of their
income in excise taxes than do higher income consumers. 111
Importantly, the cost imposition and welfare loss from this
regressive tax (higher prices) is likely to be far out of proportion to
whatever benefits CPA liability may generate. That is, the normal case
for products liability – that consumers may pay more but at the same
time are made better off from the safer products that liability induces –
has little application to CPA liability. While it is true that the threat of
CPA liability will deter some actors from engaging in practices that truly
are “unfair” or “deceptive,” liability under the substantive “unfair” or
“deceptive” standard is so arbitrary and uncertain that any and every
seller faces potential CPA liability, even those whose selling practices
are actually providing valuable information to consumers. Indeed, as
many of the most unscrupulous sellers may be judgment proof, it is
111
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precisely those sellers who are most stable and enduring in the
marketplace who are most at risk from CPA liability.
(ii) The Welfare Loss When CPA Liability Chills Informative
Advertising
With many selling practices, it may be that CPA liability is so
unpredictable that sellers can do nothing to avoid it, so that the excise tax
analysis just presented gives us a fairly complete picture of the consumer
welfare loss from CPA liability. But when it comes to CPA liability
triggered by product labeling and advertising, both theory and anecdotal
evidence suggest that sellers will interpret the CPA system as sending a
quite clear signal that the way to reduce expected CPA liability is to
either simply not advertise or communicate about certain product
characteristics at all, or to do so in a highly qualified and conditional
way. In this section, we show that such restrictions on informative
advertising can clearly harm consumer welfare.
To understand how consumer welfare can suffer when CPA
liability chills sellers’ incentive to advertise and communicate with
consumers, it is necessary to review briefly the economics of advertising.
There are a number of different economic explanations for
advertising. 112 On one set of theories, advertising is simply directed to
persuading consumers to buy a particular brand over others by
influencing consumer tastes or preferences. On these theories,
advertising usually tends to be socially wasteful, as it is simply a zerosum game where firms compete for a fixed set of consumers that ends
up only increasing costs and creating barriers to entry. 113 Other
economic theories explain how by conveying information to consumers,
advertising can have the socially desirable effect of lowering consumer
search costs and/or facilitating mutual beneficial market transactions that
would otherwise not occur. 114 Economists have furthermore recognized
that advertising can convey information about products both directly –
through content that provides information about product characteristics,
112
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location, function or price – and indirectly.
That advertising can be indirectly informative is a consequence
of the general effect of advertising in expanding demand for the
advertised product. When high quality firms also are efficient, with low
marginal cost and therefore more to gain by investing in demandexpanding costly advertising, and consumers know this, then advertising
signals high quality. 115 Another content-independent mechanism by
which advertising can convey information to consumers is especially
important for experience goods, where the consumer learns the actual
quality of the good after buying and using it, and where consumers can
be repeat buyers. For such goods, the value of an initial sale is likely to
be higher for high quality firms, because consumers who buy the high
quality good will become repeat purchasers. In such a market, high
quality firms gain more from advertising than do low quality firms, and
therefore high quality firms will use high advertising expenditures to
distinguish themselves. Advertising content per se is not important in
such a model. 116
A final and especially important way that advertising can be
informative is by helping match consumers with varying tastes to
products with varying characteristics. While such matching is not
strictly dependent upon advertising content (it can under some
circumstances be accomplished by targeting costly advertising only at
particular types of consumers 117 ), most match-type advertising has
content that informs consumers about the product characteristics,
function and location.
Such models perceive a basic economic tradeoff in providing
information about product characteristics: on the one hand, by informing
consumers as to whether it is worth their while to incur the cost of
searching further and buying a particular product, such advertising
generates a sure social benefit by expanding markets and increasing the
number of mutually beneficial transactions that occur. On the other
hand, as advertising content becomes very more detailed and extensive,
when a consumer who sees such an advertisement proceeds to a store to
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buy the product she thereby reveals to the firm that she has a very strong
preference for the product – there is a good match between her
preferences and product characteristics – information that the firm will
wish to use by charging a high price. Informative advertising content
thus has two fundamental but conflicting effects: it generates better
consumer/product matches and bigger markets, but also reduces sales
due to higher prices. 118 Essentially, firms are faced with a dilemma: if
they provide too fine-grained information about the product, then
consumers know that they will have to pay a relatively high price for the
product (as the ad has told them so much that the only consumers who
show up to buy perceive that the product is really what they want). If
they provide too little and it is costly for consumers to search and shop,
then too few consumers will show up to purchase. The profit
maximizing solution for the firm is to provide some information about
product characteristics, but not such extensive or detailed information
about product characteristics that only consumers with a very high
willingness to pay arrive to buy the product. 119 Somewhat nonintuitively, it is when search costs are high and the firm’s profit
maximizing price is low relative to search costs that a (monopoly) firm’s
private interest in attracting consumers can correspond perfectly with the
social interest if which a consumer buys if and only if trade results in
consumer surplus that exceeds her search costs. For lower search costs,
the firm’s price is high relative to search costs so some consumers may
not buy even though their value is above the cost of search.
The crucial result in this recent economic literature on advertising
is that both consumers and firms can benefit from mass market
communications that convey only partial or incomplete information.
CPAs, however, put firms in the position of either saying virtually
everything that they can imagine about a product, or else saying
nothing. 120 For example, the dairy industry has been attacked under
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threat of liability motivate sellers to devote additional time and resources toward
providing extensive information to consumers, in order to ensure statutory compliance
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CPAs for stating that milk products can promote weight loss while
failing to label dairy products with warnings of the effects of lactose for
those who are or may become lactose intolerant. 121 Automobile insurers
have similarly been sued under CPAs for failing to tell consumers that
they were requiring automobile repair shops to use generic (non-OEM)
auto replacement parts, this despite state regulations allowing (and even
sometimes requiring) the use of generic parts.122 Cases such as these tell
firms that unless they convey virtually every piece of discouraging
information about a product that can imagined, then they face possible
punitive liability. In other words, CPA liability tells firms that they face
liability unless their marketing communications disclose every
characteristic that could possibly cause a consumer to revise downward
her willingness to pay for the product. Even worse, as in the examples
just proffered, such information pertains to product characteristics – the
unsuitability of milk for people who are lactose intolerant, the use of
generic parts – that are very obscure, in the sense that a consumer may
not understand precisely how the presence or absence of such a
characteristic really impacts her likely utility from consumption.
There is no hard evidence about how such forced negative
disclosure affects different types of consumers. In terms of the
theoretically relevant distinctions, there are two possibilities. One
possibility is that the negative disclosures have their greatest impact on
or minimize their exposure to liability. Consequently, consumers are bombarded with
information, much of which may be confusing or simply irrelevant for the purpose of
adequately informing their purchase decisions. The time it takes consumers to
effectively sift through the excess of information contributes to the total cost, in time
and resources, dedicated to a particular transaction. Therefore, as a result of overall
increase in information that a seller presents due to CPAs, consumer transaction costs
increase. Professor Jeff Sovern has recognized that CPAs often cause transaction costs
to increase but argues that what is needed is more regulation to prevent merchants from
passing on these costs to consumers. Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer
Protection Statutes: The Problem of Increased Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1635 (2006).
121
Cases discussed and cited in Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 9, at 4, n. 203.
One must wonder if any regulations can protect lactose intolerant individuals who have
not figured out that they have a problem with milk.
122
Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill.
App. 2001) [reversed on appeal to Illinois Supreme Court] Avery v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005). Also see insurance cases where supposed
the life insurance illustrations were deceptive, such as In Re Great Southern Life Ins.
Co. Sales Litig., 192 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (where failure to disclose the
methods behind financial projections used in a marketing tool for a “vanishing
premium” policy was a basis for a claim) and Boswell v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 643
So.2d 580 (Ala. 1994) (where misrepresentation that new policy provided additional
coverage was basis for a claim).
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the search and purchase decisions of consumers who based on the match
information that the firm voluntarily advertises have already decided not
to actually shop for the product. In this case, the disclosures induced by
the risk of punitive CPA liability would have little impact on market
equilibria because they would merely reinforce the firm’s interest in
deterring low value consumers from incurring search costs. But if the
negative disclosures that CPA liability essentially forces are most likely
to impact the search and purchase decisions of consumers who otherwise
would be high value, causing them perhaps incorrectly to downwardly
revise their expected value from the product, then CPA liability will have
seriously impacted the economic function of match advertising. If firms
cannot send partial information in their advertising, but must include
bizarre negative information of unclear meaning or relevance to
consumers or else incur potentially large liability, then firms may not
provide any product characteristic information. For goods with low
search costs, the social loss will be relatively low: consumers will search
for such goods even if they don’t know very much about whether the
product really suits their preferences. But for goods with higher search
costs, the impact of CPA liability in deterring advertising may be such
that there is too little information to justify consumers in incurring search
costs, and markets with such high search costs may unbundle.
III. THE PROPER ROLE FOR STATE CPAS AMONG THE
INSTITUTIONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
The economic analysis of state CPAs presented in the previous
part of this Article has shown that the current state CPA regime likely
has seriously adverse consequences for the welfare of the very group that
such laws are designed to help – consumers. But showing that the
current regime is fundamentally flawed does not by itself indicate what
should be done to fix it. From an economic point of view, the
prescription for fixing the state CPA mess begins by understanding the
proper role for CPA liability within the broader institutional landscape of
consumer protection. In other words, the proper role for and design of
state CPA liability cannot be determined unless one understands the role
played by CPA liability as a supplement to other institutions of consumer
protection. As aptly put recently by Professor Timothy J. Muris, former
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, these institutions are
interdependent:
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One can envision the American system of consumer
protection as a three-legged stool: a first leg of competition
based on free enterprise with a second leg the legal structure
of contract, property and other private law that largely
focuses on the relative rights of particular parties. A twolegged stool will not be very stable. Likewise, markets and
private legal rights, while indispensable to the American
economic system, may falter in key respects. These legs can
better support the American economic system when
buttressed by a third leg. Public agencies – entrusted to
promote consumer welfare by preserving competition and
protecting consumers – work as this third leg, reinforcing the
other two. 123
As Muris suggests, state CPA liability should be understood as
supplementing the protection that consumers get from markets and the
common law on the one hand and from FTC enforcement under the FTC
Act on the other. In this Part, we argue that there is indeed a potential
role for state CPAs in supplementing markets, the common law, and
FTC enforcement, and derive the proper role for state CPAs from the
limitations of the market, common law, and FTC enforcement.
A. Market Forces for Consumer Protection – And How Private
Litigation under State CPAs Interfere with Those Forces
Even if there were no laws or regulations protecting consumers
against false and misleading seller practices, under certain conditions,
the market itself generates strong incentives for sellers to inform
consumers about product quality. Most straightforwardly, consumers
have every incentive to become informed about not only the goods that
they buy but about the sellers from whom they buy them, and sellers
have strong incentives to develop and maintain a reputation for making
truthful and informative claims about the goods and services that they
sell. A traditional – indeed in some sense the traditional – economic
criticism of consumer protection regulation whether by the FTC or CPAs
is that market forces such as reputation can have a stronger, and more
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Muris, supra note 12, at 4-5.
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precise, disciplining effect on seller misbehavior than any lawsuit. 124
We agree with the argument that market forces for consumer protection
are much stronger than many advocates of consumer protection laws
tend to believe. However, the role of the market is much more nuanced
than some law and economics scholars seem to assume. As we now
explain, the strength of market incentives for consumer protection
depends upon both seller and buyer type: upon the ability of repeat
sellers to identify their product to consumers via pricing, branding and
advertising; upon the extent to which consumers are repeat purchasers
and the cost and speed with which consumers obtain information about
product quality. As we also explain, in their current form, state CPA’s
may actually hinder rather than assist market forces for consumer
protection.
1. The Lemons Market Problem
As an analytical benchmark, consider first the extreme case,
where consumers are omniscient. In this case, even without taking any
sort of costly action, consumers have perfect information about the price
and characteristics of every product or service. With such free and
perfect information, it is almost a tautology that consumers cannot be
misled by anything that a seller might say about the product or service.
Consumers might still be subject to monopoly pricing, but this would be
due to lack of competition, not misleading or deceptive practices by
manufacturers or distributors.
Once we move to the more realistic case – where at least some
consumers are at best imperfectly informed about the product or service
– imperfect information has potentially serious consequences for
consumer welfare. If consumers can acquire perfect information about
all product characteristics, including price, but have a positive cost of
search, then market prices will generally exceed the competitive level. 125
124

As argued recently by Omri Ben-Shahar in delivering the annual Coase Lecture
at the University of Chicago. See Student Blogger – The Myths of Consumer
Protection Law, February 26, 2009, available at
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/the-myths-of-consumer-protectionlaw.html#more. See also Hadfield et al., supra note___ (arguing that in many
consumer markets there are “well-developed reputation mechanisms permitting other
consumers to monitor the extent to which a merchant lives up to its promises.”)
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More precisely, there is a general tendency for market prices to increase to
the monopoly level, as consumer search costs increase. See A. Sadanand and Louis
Wilde, A generalized model of pricing for homogeneous goods under imperfect
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With incomplete consumer information about product quality,
market existence itself becomes an issue. In the standard model of such
markets, it is assumed that information is asymmetric, in that while
sellers of goods or services know the actual quality of the goods or
services they sell, buyers only know average quality. Under such
informational conditions, if high quality sellers cannot credibly identify
themselves, so that buyers effectively think every seller’s good is of
average quality, then buyers will not pay more than the value of average
quality. If high cost – high quality sellers cannot charge more than this
average-quality price, then they cannot make a profit. But when the
very highest quality sellers drop out of the market, then the average
quality falls, and now the new highest quality sellers may be losing
money, causing them to leave the market, and so on, leading to the nonexistence of market equlibrium.
This result – that asymmetric
information can cause markets to unravel, with low quality goods in
effect driving out high quality goods – is known as the lemons market
problem (with name corresponding to the problem caused by
automobiles that are poor quality “lemons.”) 126
2. Overcoming Lemons Markets through Voluntary Disclosure:
The Unraveling Result
In reality, lemons problems rarely cause markets to fail.
Lemons markets are overcome because producers and consumers have
strong incentives to respectively communicate and obtain credible and
accurate information as to product quality. Because consumers will pay
more for a high quality good or service, a high cost/high quality seller
generally has a very strong incentive to inform consumers about the
quality of her product. It has been demonstrated that when consumers
cannot costlessly and perfectly verify ex ante the truth of seller claims
about product quality, then they will assume that quality is the worst
possible consistent with a particular seller disclosure. Such consumer
expectations in turn generate an equilibrium in which the highest quality
information, 49 Rev. Econ. Stud. 229 (1982); Stephen Salop and Joseph Stiglitz,
Bargains and Rip-offs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersions, 44
Rev. Econ. Stud. 493 (1977). As is well known, monopoly prices exceed the social
marginal cost of production, leading to socially suboptimal levels of consumption and a
distortion in the allocation of capital.
126

George A. Ackerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
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seller type perfectly and exactly reveals quality, causing the next highest
quality seller to also perfectly reveal quality, and so on, in a process
where seller private information completely unravels and rational
consumers are fully and completely informed about product quality.127
Such voluntary disclosure eliminates the lemons market problem,
because since good sellers can easily distinguish themselves from bad
sellers just by making truthful and fully informative disclosures, good
sellers will enter the market and effectively drive out the lowest quality
sellers. 128
The world posited by the unraveling result is one in which
consumers are perfectly rational (in that they fully understand the
relevant incentives and can deduce market equilibria) and can perfectly
and costlessly verify seller statements about product quality. In such a
world, the question is not whether sellers will lie about product quality –
they cannot, by assumption – but how much they will reveal about
product quality. 129 The unraveling result is that in such a world, rather
than issuing vague statements about product quality – such as “fish
weighing at least ten and as much as twenty pounds” – sellers will issue
precise statements about product quality – such as “fish weighing 11.2
pounds.”
The assumptions underlying the unraveling result are severe, and
although some assumptions turn out not to be crucial to the result of full
quality disclosure (e.g., the result holds under monopolistic as well as
competitive product markets) 130 others are required. 131 In particular,
127

This is known as the “unraveling” result on quality disclosure, and was
developed independently by Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of
Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J. Law & Econ. 461
(1981) and Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications, 12 Bell J. Econ. 380 (1981). The result is explicated and its limitations
discussed in Joseph Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result,
and Comments on Its Importance, in Antitrust and Regulation 91 (Robert E. Grieson,
ed., 1986).
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See J. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & Econ. 291, 502 (1981).
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An observation made by Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties,
supra note __ at 462.
130
See Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, supra note __.
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If, for example, disclosure itself is costly, then sellers disclose if any only if
quality is above some threshold level.Boyan Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of
Information, 13 Bell J. Econ. 36 (1982). SIMILARLY, IF IT IS costly for sellers to
become informed about their product quality, then sellers become informed only if the
cost of doing so is low, and disclose only if the information that they learn is favorable.
See, for example, Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure, supra note __ and Steven Shavell,
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 Rand J. Econ. 20 (1994).
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when a sufficiently large number of consumers cannot understand the
disclosure – because it contains somewhat technical data regarding the
product, for example – then voluntary disclosure of quality may not
occur. 132 As we argued earlier, the very expansive and uncertain
construction of what might constitute an “unfair” or “deceptive” practice
under state CPA laws actually creates an incentive for sellers to make
precisely the kind of long and technically detailed disclosures – precisely
the kind that many consumers cannot understand, and which may destroy
the possibility of avoiding lemons market problems through voluntary
disclosure. This is, indeed, an extraordinarily perverse result – private
litigation under state CPAs (by reducing voluntary disclosure) may
trigger calls for mandatory disclosure.
3. Consumer Search and Product Use, and Seller Reputation
As explained below, when we cannot rely on voluntary disclosure
because seller claims about product quality cannot be costly and
perfectly verified by consumers, the common law of contract, and fraud,
become important supplements, and adjuncts, to market incentives for
product quality disclosure. But of course consumers need not rely
solely on seller statements for information about product quality.
Consumers may learn about product quality by searching for and
observing products (trying on a coat, for example) before purchase, or
after they purchase and use the good (buying and then using a
television). Consumer search, observation and product use are all very
important market mechanisms that not only restore equilibrium in
markets with imperfectly informed consumers but also discipline
deceptive selling practices.
In the economics literature, goods whose quality the consumer
can identify by simply examining the good are known as search goods,
while goods whose quality can be determined by consumers only after
purchasing and using the good are known as experience goods. 133 With
132

Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory versus Voluntary
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J. Law, Econ. &
Org. 45 (2003). Additionally, when firms sell differentiated, multi-attribute products to
consumers with varying preferences over those attributes, firms may not voluntarily
disclose because disclosure may increase the price elasticity of demand with respect to
some products. V. Joseph Hotz and Mo Xiao, Strategic Information Disclosure: The
Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers, NBER Working
Paper No. W11937, January, 2006.
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See, e.g., A. M. Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Quarterly Journal of
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search goods, consumers can learn about quality, and reward high quality
providers with higher prices, if the cost of searching and observing
quality is sufficiently low that they will continue to search – moving on
to another store – if they observe unexpectedly low quality. 134 Indeed,
with search goods, high prices may themselves signal high quality, since
provided that search costs are not too high, consumers will always
continue to shop if they observe low quality but high prices at a
particular seller. 135
With experience goods, it is generally much more costly for the
consumer to actually judge quality, since judging quality requires buying
and using the product for some time period. For durable goods,
moreover, the required period of use may be quite long. 136 With
experience goods, the power of the market as a force disciplining low
quality sellers depends crucially on how long it takes consumers to
actually learn the quality of the good or service through consumption.
As one would expect, therefore, existing empirical evidence shows that
consumer experience good learning varies with the type of good. For
some goods, such as laundry detergent, it seems that consumers already
Economics 355 (1974); and A.M. Spence, Competitive and Optimal Responses to
Signals, 7 Journal of Economic Theory 296 (1974).
134
This result also establishes the existence of markets in heterogeneous search
goods (so that the lemons market nonexistence problem is overcome). See Birger
Wernerfelt, Selling Formats for Search Goods, 13 Marketing. Sci. 298 (1994). Alan
Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous
Goods under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy Implications,
13 Bell J. Econ. 181 (1982),
135
For this result, see Paul W.J. De Bijl, Entry deterrence and signaling in markets
for search goods, 16 Intl. J. Indus. Org. 1 (1997). More generally, when some
consumers are informed about product quality and some are not, high and declining
prices may be a credible signal of high quality. The reason is that the loss of sales
volume caused by high prices is relatively less costly to high cost – high quality sellers,
and the loss of sales volume is in any case greater for low quality sellers, who lose more
sales from informed consumers. See Kyle Bagwell and Michael H. Riordan, High and
Declining Prices Signal Product Quality, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 224 (1991).
136
For this reason, the composition of the consumer pool for an experience good
changes over time following the introduction of a new good, and sales generate not
only revenue for sellers, but also an increasingly large number of informed consumers.
In light of these two effects, economists have shown that pricing for experience goods
is generally dynamic, with prices sometimes starting high and then falling (with socalled mass market goods, where most consumers are quite sure even before
consumption that they value the good highly), and sometimes starting low and then
rising (for so-called niche goods, where consumers are not as optimistic about the value
of the good ex ante). For this result, and a very clear summary of the theoretical
literature on experience good pricing with imperfectly informed consumers, see Dirk
Bergemant and Juulo Välimäki, Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods, 114 J.
Pol. Econ. 713 (2006).
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know everything at the time of purchase (such goods are actually search
goods). 137 For other goods and services – yogurt and (some)
pharmaceuticals, and auto vehicle inspections – empirical evidence
shows that consumers learn quickly about product quality and quickly
adjust their purchases according to what they learn. 138 For a final
category of goods – automobile insurance – it seems that the
opportunities for consumer experience learning are too infrequent, and
switching costs perhaps too high, for experiential learning to have much
of an impact on consumer buying behavior. 139
Thus for experience goods – a large and important category that
includes many or perhaps most consumer durable goods – the ability of
consumers to learn about quality and then base their future purchase
choices on such information is likely to vary systematically with the type
of good, and in particular with the speed at which consumers learn
information about quality and the cost to them of switching purchases.
In other words, the ability of repeat customers to punish sellers who have
deceived them by simply taking their business elsewhere is indeed a
market force favoring high quality experience goods and deterring
deceptive claims about such goods, but its strength is not likely to be the
same for all kinds of experience goods. 140
From the point of view of sellers, for either search or experience
goods (or services) sellers of high quality goods have an incentive to
identify themselves to repeat purchasers through brand name and
trademarks so as to earn, and keep their business. Sellers who sell low
quality merchandise may enjoy some short term profits by charging
relatively high prices for low-cost and low quality goods, but in the
longer term, the ability of consumers to discern product quality through
use, and to identify and reward sellers of high quality products, can make
it economically rational for sellers to invest in producing high cost, high
137

Tulin Erdem and Michael P. Keane, Decision-Making under Uncertainty:
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quality products. 141
Strictly speaking, however, the withdrawal of possible repeat
business is not always sufficient for such reputational sanctions to
effectively drive out cheating or disreputable sellers. Reputation can
provide a perfect discipline against low quality or deceptive sellers only
if all future buyers (including those who do not have first-hand
experience) have knowledge of a seller’s failure to deliver on its promise
of high quality. 142 Some such general reputational information is
provided by the increasingly important word-of-mouth communication
conduit. But consumer demand for information about past seller
performance elicits more than queries of other consumers. To satisfy
this demand for information, the market itself, through sources such as
“Consumer Reports” and “Angie’s List,” provides information about
sellers to consumers. Such profit-driven information intermediaries
provide the information about product quality that is necessary for
market reputation to discipline and restore equilibrium in consumer
markets for experience goods. 143
Such intermediaries are an even more important market response
to imperfect consumer information with another category of goods and
services called “credence goods.” Credence goods are goods for which
quality cannot be determined by the consumer even after consuming the
product. 144 For example, even repeat purchases and consumption cannot
determine the accuracy of a seller’s claim that their dark chocolate
reduces one’s chance of cardiovascular problems. As this example
indicates, for many credence goods and services, expert providers often
know more about the quality of good that a consumer needs than does
the consumer, and because of this extreme form of information
141
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asymmetry, it is possible for disreputable providers to charge the
consumer for goods or services never provided, or providing the wrong
quantity or type of goods or services to the consumer (under under- or
over-providing). 145 Credence goods are like experience goods for which
the consumers’ experience provides no information to the consumer
about the quality of the good or service or the truth of the seller’s
statements about her needs, unless first analyzed and interpreted by a
third party expert. Indeed, because the consumer can be perfectly
satisfied with the observed outcome and yet have received the wrong
good or service or been mislead as to the good or service, direct
consumer sanctions – such as failing to buy again from or bad-mouthing
a particular seller – are inherently limited in the case of credence
goods. 146
For this reason, it is perhaps unsurprising that the market alone
suffices to discipline credence good suppliers if and only if a number of
very restrictive conditions are met. 147 Still, while it is in general more
difficult for third parties to evaluate and provide information to
consumers about the quality of credence goods and services than to
evaluate and provide information about experience goods and services, it
is not impossible. In the medical service area, for example, a number of
states have recently begun to provide co-called “medical report cards”
that give consumers accessible information about crucial medical
outcomes (such as mortality rates) at different hospitals. While it is
unclear whether such report cards are having their impact on patients –
who choose to stay away from hospitals with bad report cards – or
hospitals – who either terminate poor-performing physicians or
encourage them to alter their practice patterns – there is evidence that
such reports have significantly improved outcomes at the low quality
hospitals in particular. 148
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In concluding this discussion of experience and credence goods,
it is important to emphasize the very real welfare consequences of
consumer deception. The weaker the ability of consumers to verify
quality through experience or outside certifiers, and the less informative
is seller reputation, the greater the probability that a consumer will buy a
poor or deceptively low quality good. Prices will send the wrong signals
for the allocation of productive effort and capital, and because they will
sometimes pay more than a product is worth to them, consumers will be
hesitant to buy at all. While not as extreme as the lemons market nonexistence result, the practical consequence of consumer deception is to
shrink the market in a socially undesirable way. 149
4. State CPA Laws as Currently Construed Hinder Rather than
Support Market Forces that Discipline Seller Deceptive Practices
The primary mechanism underlying market forces for consumer
protection is accurate and verifiable information. However they obtain it
-- whether through search, product use, or third party evaluators – it is
such information that allows consumers to discipline sellers who engage
in deceptive practices by taking their business elsewhere, and to reward
with their continuing business sellers who establish a reputation for
honesty and quality. From the point of view of supporting these positive
market forces, the key question about the current CPA regime is whether
or not the signal sent by CPA liability adds to the amount of useful
information possessed by market participants, or instead detracts from it.
Our earlier analysis of both the CPA process and the substantive
standard for CPA liability strongly suggests that the current CPA regime
may significantly blur the information that consumers have about
producers, thus hindering rather than supporting market forces.
The primary defect of the CPA regime as currently configured is
that it creates incentives for class action attorneys to bring suits in order
to obtain settlements from defendants whose conduct was almost surely
neither deceptive nor misleading in any meaningful way.
Cutler et. Al. found evidence indicating that the system especially improved the
performance of low-quality hospitals. Hospitals labeled as high mortality initially
decreased bypass surgery volume by about 10 percent (for an average-sized hospital),
with the decrease almost entirely among the healthiest patients (who presumably did
not need the surgery at all in many cases).
149
For an excellent survey of the various ways consumers may become informed
and the consequence of imperfect information, see Joseph Stiglitz, The Causes and
Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1987).
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Announcements of settlements of claims that are actually meritless may
convey false information to consumers. More importantly, for sellers
who are selling precisely the goods that they claim to be – honest sellers
– the prospect of being sued and ending up paying potentially large class
actions settlements lowers the return from such honest behavior relative
to the return from opportunistic behavior. To be blunt, if a seller is going
to be sued under a state CPA and made to pay roughly the same amount
regardless of whether or not she has tried to increase her sales and profits
by deceiving consumers, then why would she rationally give up the extra
profits obtainable through deception? By both confusing consumers and
confronting honest sellers with a risk of CPA liability, the current CPA
significantly interferes with market mechanisms for consumer protection.
B. The Common Law and its Limitations as a Supplement to
Market Forces for Consumer Protection
As we have seen, market sanctions against low quality or
deceptive sellers are not perfect, and are dependent upon the speed and
accuracy with which consumers observe actual product quality and with
which product quality information is transmitted to other market
participants. However, by enforcing promises to provide goods of a
particular quality – warranties – and by penalizing false and misleading
seller communications about product quality as fraudulent, the common
law of contract itself may significantly enhance market incentives for
consumer protection.
1. The Power of Contractual Commitment
Through the simple but powerful device of making contractual
promises of quality – warranties – legally enforceable, the common law
can greatly strengthen market forces for consumer protection. To see
this, consider the case of an experience good where buyers and sellers
are not repeat players. As explained earlier, in this case, voluntary
disclosure of product quality will not occur when consumers cannot
perfectly and costlessly verify the truth of the disclosure. However,
because the good is, by assumption, an experience good, consumers do
learn the quality of the product through use. Provided that warranties of
quality – promises of quality, that is – are legally enforceable, high
quality–high cost sellers can distinguish themselves to consumers by
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making such warranties. Here, legally enforceable means that quality
failures are not only observable by consumers but also verifiable to
courts. When quality is both ex post observable and ex post verifiable,
any given warranty is less costly to a high-quality seller, then it can be
shown that under both monopolistic and competitive product markets,
sellers of high quality goods perfectly distinguish themselves by offering
complete or full warranties. 150
Warranties are by no means the only contractual mechanism by
which high quality sellers attempt to distinguish themselves from low
quality sellers. Liberal product return policies, such as promises to take
products back and then repair or replace defective products at no cost to
the consumer, are generally costlier to low quality sellers than to high
quality sellers. Hence such return policies can also allow high quality
sellers to distinguish themselves from low quality sellers. 151
2. Common Law Fraud and Information Disclosure
An equally important common law doctrine protecting consumers
is fraud. Economic models that predict full voluntary disclosure of
product quality in fact hinge upon the assumption that false statements
about product quality are not made because of certain detection and high
penalties for such statements. 152 Another way to put the “unraveling
result” discussed earlier is indeed that if false seller statements are
precluded either by perfect consumer knowledge or by effective
penalties, then sellers will not only disclose truthful product quality
information, but will be induced by market competition to fully and
precisely disclose product quality.
In practical terms, the way in which such market disclosure
works is elegantly simple. Simply by asking sellers to describe the
various attributes of the good for sale, consumers elicit either vague
answers – at the extreme, the answer of “we don’t know, it could be
150
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anything” – or precise answers. A perfect fraud rule confronts sellers
with certain large penalties if they make a false precise statement.
Hence with such a fraud rule in place, sellers either make an accurate
precise statement about product quality, or a vague statement. But this is
precisely the set of options that generates the unraveling result: high
quality sellers precisely reveal product quality, and consumers rationally
infer the lowest quality consistent with a vague seller disclosure, causing
all sellers to precisely reveal product quality. Thus if consumers know
that the common law fraud doctrine prevents sellers from lying to them
about product quality, then consumers themselves can elicit full
disclosure even about multi-attribute items simply by asking sellers to
describe the various attributes of the goods for sale.
3. Limitations to Common Law, Market-Based Consumer
Protection
Inasmuch as the effectiveness of market incentives for consumer
protection depends upon the common law enforcement of warranties and
the prohibition of fraud, weaknesses and imperfections in the common
law weaken market incentives for consumer protection. If promises
were perfectly and costlessly interpreted and enforced by courts, then a
seller would incur liability for breaching a warranty of quality whenever,
but only when, it actually breached the warranty. But courts are not
perfect. Sometimes a seller might be held liable for breach of warranty
even though the product fully lived up to its promised quality.
Sometimes a warranty might be breached, and yet the consumer would
either be unable to discern the breach or find the cost of suit too high to
merit filing a lawsuit. Even if a consumer sues, courts may mistakenly
find no breach of warranty despite the provision of lower quality than
promised.
The various costs and errors of common law litigation mean that
legally enforceable promises can be exploited by opportunistic sellers
and consumers. An opportunistic seller can provide a warranty without
any intention of honoring the warranty should the product fail. To the
extent that some buyers will rely on the warranty, those consumers are
harmed. Moreover, such a phantom warranty can cause a competitive
imbalance by giving an advantage (perhaps only temporary) to the
dishonest sellers. In the extreme, a lemons market can develop.153
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Conversely, opportunistic consumers might well take advantage of
liberal and legally enforceable return policies to use and then return nondefective durable goods, essentially obtaining a free rental. Similarly,
opportunistic consumers might claim breach of warranty for quality
defects due not to anything that the seller did, but to the consumer’s own
mis- or overuse of the product. Such consumer opportunism causes
sellers to limit the range of legally enforceable promises that they make
to consumers, making it more difficult for high quality, reputable sellers
to signal their type to consumers, and ultimately hurting honest but
imperfectly informed consumers. 154
The primary “consumer law” provisions of the common law –
actions for fraudulent misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation –
are similarly far from the ideal market support mechanisms. 155 A
common law action for fraudulent misrepresentation generally required
the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally and knowingly
deceived the plaintiff regarding a material fact and that the plaintiff
justifiably relied on the misstatement which caused the plaintiff’s
financial loss. 156 It was difficult for consumers to prove these elements.
Even when a plaintiff could prove all of the elements, common law
actions were viable only when the plaintiff’s damages were large enough
to justify the cost of suing, something that was not often the case in
typical consumer fraud actions.157
The common law of fraudulent misrepresentation was gradually
supplemented by negligent misrepresentation which allowed recourse
even when the defendant did not knowingly misrepresent a material fact
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but did so because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the truth. 158
Specifically, a plaintiff had to show that the defendant made a false
statement because of lack of reasonable care in determining the facts or
in the manner of expression or an absence of skill or competence
expected in a given industry or profession. 159 The plaintiff also had to
show that it was reasonable to rely on the defendant’s statement and the
statement caused the plaintiff’s injury. 160 These last few requirements
gave plaintiffs the same problems that abounded with fraudulent
misrepresentation, mainly that the common law had no form of recourse
to punish the defendant before the plaintiff went through with the
transaction and that the cost of bringing the suit far outweighed the
actual damages. Contract law was equally unhelpful because businesses
were often able to make false claims in their advertising materials
without actually entering into a contract. 161
4. The Common Law’s Shortcomings: A Role for Federal and
State Consumer Protection
Thus, as a general matter, the effectiveness of the common law as
a mechanism enabling market incentives for quality is limited by two
factors:
i) Imperfect Determination of Liability: the general imperfection
the common law process in determining whether warranties and similar
promises have been breached and in determining whether a false
statement had been knowingly or negligently made;
ii) Disproportionate Costs of Liability Determination: the
tendency for individual costs of bringing suit to be greater than the loss
from seller deception about product quality.
These analytical conclusions tell us what a consumer protection
regulatory system (whether federal or state) would look like if, as its
proponents originally intended, it were truly designed to supplement the
shortcomings in the consumer protections provided by a market system
subject only to the common law. 162 Such a system would indeed need to
158

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).
Id.
160
Id.
161
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (1981).
162
See Muris, supra note __, at 14 (“Consumer protection policy also has a vital
role in supporting markets. It helps ensure that consumers can make well-informed
decisions about their choices and that sellers will fulfill their promises and not increase
sales by lying about their products. Thus, prevention of deception helps consumers in
159

55

locate a procedural device for overcoming the lack of viability of
individual suits. The class action is such a device. But it would not need
to supplement the class action with statutory, enhanced or punitive
damages. And most importantly, it would need to send a signal that is
very clear ex ante as to precisely what kinds of seller conduct and seller
communications run afoul of the statutory standard. As we have argued,
the current CPA regime of private enforcement does not do this.
C. Regulation: Market Monitoring and Intervention by the Federal
Trade Commission
As described earlier, in supplementing market and common law
forces for consumer protection, CPAs do not stand alone, but against the
background provided by FTC regulation. Such regulation is indeed the
traditional (and sometimes economically recommended) response to a
perceived inadequacy of markets and the common law. 163 On the view
that the purpose of state CPAs are to supplement optimally the gaps in
deterrence already achieved by the market and the common law, as well
as federal enforcement, the logical question to ask is whether and how
the FTC regulatory regime needs to be supplemented at all.
1. Key Aspects of the FTC Enforcement Regime
Perhaps the most direct, market-oriented regulatory strategy to
two ways: first, most obviously, by deterring deceptive sellers; and second by making it
easier for honest sellers to make credible claims about their products.”).
163
In addition to state and federal consumer protection law, the federal antitrust
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protect consumers from exploitation due to incomplete, asymmetric
information is for the government to simply require sellers to disclose
certain information to consumers. This has been the predominant
approach of federal securities regulation since its inception in 1933, and
other federal agencies adopt a similar strategy for at least part of their
regulatory function (e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission, Food
and Drug Administration, and Occupational Health and Safety
Administration). Another regulatory strategy is for government
regulators to promote competition through antitrust policy on the belief
that “robust competition in a strong market is the primary bulwark of
consumer protection.” 164
Congress expanded and clarified the FTC’s consumer protection
function in 1938 when it amended the FTC Act to grant the Commission
the power to regulate all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce” 165 regardless of whether the act affected competition
between businesses 166 or merely the communication between a business
and consumer. 167 The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 left the task of
determining what constituted “unfair or deceptive” to the Commission.
It has been suggested that the difficulty in pinning down a definition of
“unfair or deceptive” and the evolving nature of the terms explains why
Congress delegated that duty to a bi-partisan expert commission and
empowered it with the tools to stop unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 168 Those definitions continue to develop through agency
guides, FTC rulemaking and through administrative adjudication and
164
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case law. 169
The current FTC definition of an unfair act is one that “causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.” 170 As applied, the
definition of unfairness is determined by a comparison of benefits and
costs of the action. 171 The definition of a deceptive act currently
involves the examination of a series of factors: “First, there must be a
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer. . . . Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. . . . Third, the
representation, omission, or practice must be a ‘material’ one.” 172 Under
contemporary regulatory practice, the FTC decides whether an
advertisement is false or misleading by looking at the “percentage of
consumers who interpret the ad as making a given claim, often relying
on empirical tests…that involve showing the disputed ad to a
representative sample of consumers.” 173 As explained by Richard
Craswell, framing the question this way has allowed the FTC (and
federal courts) to look and apply a “sliding scale, in which the number of
consumers affected and the seriousness of their potential losses are both
taken into account.” 174 Under this approach, the greater the importance
of the product attribute advertised – and the injury that would therefore
be done if consumers were mislead about it – the smaller the threshold
proportion of consumers that are mislead about it for the FTC to deem
the ad misleading. 175
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As further observed by Professor Craswell, even though the FTC
has not often explicitly recognized that its decisions about whether or not
a seller communication is deceptive are based on such a cost-benefit
calculus, “a good deal” of cost-benefit analysis in fact underlies such
decisions. 176 Thus even though the FTC does not need to show that the
defendant intended to deceive, that anyone was injured, or that the
defendant even made a false statement, 177 its practice has increasingly
bee guided by a consumer welfare standard, and the agency eschews
bringing actions where technical or inconsequential violations have not
resulted in meaningful harm to consumers.
Another feature of the FTC enforcement regime that
distinguishes it from the state CPA regime is the enforcement process
and remedy. Very often, the FTC issues an administrative complaint,
and such complaints have over the years generated hundreds of decisions
by FTC administrative law judges and thousands of consent
agreements. 178 In addition to the administrative law process, the FTC
now “frequently” uses the additional enforcement authority given to it in
1975 to go directly into federal court, where the remedy is usually a
cease and desist order, injunction or settlement. 179
2. State CPAs Fail to Optimally Compliment FTC Enforcement
The economically justified role for state CPAs in complimenting
FTC enforcement depends upon why it is that one believes that FTC
enforcement is insufficient. One possibility is that the FTC is doing
precisely what it should be doing, on economic grounds, but is subject to
inevitable enforcement shortfalls due to its limited budget. The other
possibility is that the FTC enforcement is inadequate because the FTC is
subject to political influences.
Suppose first that the FTC is doing precisely what it should be
doing on economic grounds. We call this the faithful agent model. This
is not a fanciful case: in our view, the FTC’s cost-benefit approach to
176

Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note __, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565,

601.
177

Jon Mize, Fencing off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-examining the role of
Little FTC Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 653, 657-658
(2005).
178
Carolyn A. Carter and Jonathan Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices 184-185 (7th ed. 2008).
179
Carter and Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, supra note __ at
185.

59

determining whether a selling practice or advertisement is false or
misleading is based on sound economic principles. In other words, on
the faithful agent view, the FTC is doing what it says it tries to do –
focus its law enforcement resources on practices that cause the greatest
consumer harm – and so has the economically correct enforcement
target. Like every regulatory agency, however, the FTC’s budget is
limited and it must therefore prioritize cases on its enforcement agenda.
Undoubtedly, some false or deceptive consumer practices escape FTC
enforcement simply because of the agency’s budget constraint. There is
no way to know for sure how often truly deceptive practices escape FTC
enforcement, but we can be sure that the probability that the FTC detects
and takes remedial action against any given deceptive practice is in
general less than one. If the FTC is behaving as a faithful agent, then it
also seems plausible that the more widespread and serious the harm from
a deceptive practice, the more likely it is that the FTC will take action to
stop it, and the sooner that such action will be taken. Companies that
are marketing and selling well known products and services on the
national market would, we expect, be squarely and continuously on the
radar screen of the FTC as faithful agent. On the other hand, firms that
sell in more limited markets, for shorter time periods, may escape FTC
detection and enforcement.
On this faithful agent story, the basic problem with FTC
enforcement against false and deceptive consumer practices is that the
expected sanction in a system that relies solely on such FTC enforcement
is likely to be too low to optimally deter such practices. The expected
sanction from FTC enforcement is too low because: a) the remedy
sought by the agency can never exceed and is generally less than the
harm caused by any such practice; and, b) the probability of detection
and sanction is never bigger than one. Due to these two facts, the
expected sanction facing a firm subject only to FTC enforcement (equal
to the probability of detection and sanction multiplied by the sanction) is
always less than the actual harm caused by the practice. As firms
internalize only the expected sanction, they internalize too little of the
harm that their false and deceptive practices may cause. Moreover, the
longer it takes the FTC to detect and get a cease and desist order against
a firm, the larger is the harm done by the false or deceptive practice (and
the greater the gain to the firm from engaging in the practice). Still,
even if the FTC recovered back all the profits earned from every firm
against which it enforced, the less-than-one probability of detection and
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enforcement means that the expected sanction is too low to optimally
deter false and deceptive practices. In many instances, potential FTC
sanctions are supplemented by adverse reputational effects so that the
inadequacy of FTC sanctions alone is corrected. Obviously, reputational
effects can combine with FTC sanctions to move closer to optional
deterrence only when the potential wrongdoer has a reputation worth
protecting.
The problem of the inadequacy of FTC sanctions alone is likely
to be most severe for firms that are smaller and operate on limited
geographic markets (or, more generally, smaller markets) and which
therefore are less likely to be on the FTC’s enforcement radar screen. If
the point of state CPA laws is to offset the inadequacy of FTC sanctions
alone, then state CPA enforcement should be targeted against these and
other any other identifiable category of firms that are unlikely to be
enforced against by the FTC.
The dual public-private enforcement of state CPAs creates
substantial challenges for CPAs to accurately or adequately address the
inadequacy of FTC sanctions. There is no reason to think that either
state attorneys general or private class action attorneys will have an
incentive to restrict their enforcement activity to firms and/or practices
that would escape FTC enforcement. In recent years, state AGs have
been criticized for their aggressive pursuit of high profile cases against
large multi-national companies – including numerous actions joined by
dozens of AGs. 180 These are precisely the companies that are likely to
be adequately policed by the FTC. AGs can easily justify the pursuit of
such extraterritorial actions as an out-of-state revenue source for the
AG’s state treasury – but that justification does not mean that the AGs’
actions enhances either consumer or taxpayer welfare. Our analysis of
private actions carries over to unwarranted actions by AGs (that is,
actions that do not satisfy a consumer welfare standard and infringe on
the FTC’s turf) and suggests that such AG prosecutions do cost in-state
consumers in the form of higher prices – an invisible tax imposed by the
AG. Of course, faithful agent AG may buck the political incentives and
not bring actions solely on revenue-generating or headline-generating
capacity. The consumer welfare standard provides a guide to which
consumer protection actions are properly pursued by AGs.
180
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The incentive of class action attorneys filing actions under CPAs
is in general to bring actions against those firms and practices that they
believe will settle quickly and on relatively generous terms. As argued
earlier, ideal targets for private lawsuits may include a mix of both small,
risk averse firm and large publicly traded corporations subject to
potential stock market impacts. While some small firms may indeed be
likely to escape FTC enforcement – and therefore ought on economic
grounds to be targeted by state CPA enforcement – private class action
attorneys may have an even stronger incentive to pursue large
multinational companies that are especially likely be under more or less
continuous scrutiny by the FTC. Unlike the faithful agent FTC,
moreover, private class action attorneys have every incentive to persuade
courts to expansively interpret the substantive “false” or “deceptive”
liability standard to encompass selling practices which the FTC would
not find to be violative of its own cost-benefit understanding of that
standard. Hence, as currently configured, state CPA liability certainly
supplements FTC enforcement, but it goes far beyond what would be
justified on optimal deterrence grounds.
It may be argued that it is much too sanguine to assume that the
FTC is a faithful agent. Instead, it may be said, the FTC is subject to a
variety of political influences that lead it to selectively enforce the FTC
Act, shying away from politically costly enforcement actions and
choosing instead to bring only those enforcement actions that promise
political benefits or at least risk minimal political costs. The general
model of agency behavior presumed by this argument – that much
agency behavior can be explained by the desire of regulatory agencies to
maximize their perceived net political benefits – is we believe in general
a quite accurate explanation of agency decision-making. 181 But to our
knowledge, there is no evidence that the interests of the FTC in
maximizing its perceived political net benefits has caused it to deviate
from its stated mission by under-enforcing against false and deceptive
practices. Instead, supporters of state CPA liability trumpet FTC
enforcement practices as a model. 182 This leads us to surmise that if
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anything, the FTC may be a bit too zealous at times, especially in its
scrutiny of the largest and most visible firms. If this is so, then this
further supports the argument that state CPA’s may be used much too
frequently against such firms.
3. National Markets and Federalism Concerns
State CPAs present a patchwork quilt of consumer protection
laws to larger consumer products and services companies with national
markets. Although state CPAs use similar terms and rely on private
enforcement, there can be dramatic differences across states in terms of
the definition of crucial terms and enforcement. The only commonality
appears to be that every state but one allows a private right of action
under their CPA. Everything else—from whether the plaintiff needs to
show reliance or actual injuries to the available remedies and everything
in between—differs from one state to the next.
The differences between these statutes make large consumer
protection class action cases ripe for forum shopping 183 which can have a
negative effect on the defendant. But the diversity of consumer
protection approaches can also make multi-state class action lawsuits a
bad deal for consumers. Additionally, the oft-cited criticism of class
actions—that the relief provided to the unnamed class members is
usually pitiful—is even clearer in the context of a large consumer
protection class action. 184
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State CPAs raise the same type of federalism challenges faced by
many other areas of regulation in a federal system. State tort law, and its
interaction with federal health and safety regulations, has been a
particularly vexing problem in recent years. 185 Our civil justice system
benefits from diffused economic and political power, but it is surely
comes with its costs. The static inefficiency caused by CPAs must be
balanced against the dynamic benefits of jurisdictional variety and the
“laboratory” of the states. A challenge is to design institutions that
maximize the net value of federalism in the face of pressure for
centralized control. Although it is tempting to advocate federal
domination of consumer protection because of the inefficiencies of the
current system of CPAs, such centralization must be evaluated in terms
of the reality that federal enforcement of consumer protection has gone
through some rough times of its own. 186 Moreover, our analysis in the
preceding subsection suggestions an economically sensible demarcation
of federal and state consumer protection enforcement actions that allows
for capturing the strength of both systems of enforcement – state CPA
enforcement should be targeted against identifiable categories of firms
that are unlikely to be effectively monitored by the FTC.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS: REMOVE REDUNDANT
“SOLUTIONS”
State CPAs are intended to complement the consumer protection
policy of the FTC, and the FTC is intended to complement the consumer
protection attributes of markets and the common law. Former FTC
Chairman Timothy Muris has characterized the institutions of consumer
protection policy – markets, common law, and regulation – as a threelegged stool. Muris cautions about the need to keep the leg of the stool
balanced. Our analysis suggests that private actions under state CPAs
have unbalancing negative consequences for all three legs of the
consumer protection stool: Markets are distorted by the perverse
incentives to either disclose too much or too little information, while
news of extortionate settlement sends inaccurate signals to consumers.
The common law has been distorted to the point that private CPA
litigation is stacked in favor of plaintiffs as CPAs have been interpreted
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185
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by courts to limit the common law protections that reflected a balance of
seller and consumer interests. And, regulation at the state level is
managed by a decentralized and uncoordinated decision making by
private plaintiffs attorneys who are not in any manner constrained by the
traditional public interest requirements of government regulation. 187
Clearly, consumer protection policy is knocked out of balance by the
current regime of state CPAs.
CPAs were designed to solve two simple economic problems: 1)
individual consumers often do not have the incentive or means to pursue
individual claims against mass marketers who engage in unfair and
deceptive practices; and, 2) because of the difficulty of establishing
elements of either common law fraud or breach of promise, those actions
alone are too weak an instrument to deter seller fraud and deception.
The most striking lesson of our analysis is that the typical state CPA –
with relaxed rules for establishing liability, statutory damages, damage
multipliers, attorneys fees and costs, and class actions – solves the basic
economic problem that CPAs were intended to address several times
over. The effect of this redundancy in solutions is that CPAs can deter
the provision of valuable information to consumers and, thus, harm
consumers. That is, as currently applied, state CPAs harm consumers.
This need not be the case.
The primary culprit in our analysis is the private cause of action
under state CPAs. Our analysis suggests that consumer welfare would
be enhanced if states did away with the private action. We are mindful
of the argument that private actions are necessary because state
governments do not have the resources to adequately enforce state CPAs.
We find this argument woefully lacking. First, it begs the question of
why states are not willing to devote the resources to adequate consumer
protection. “Protecting consumers” would seem to be a proper and
popular service for a government to provide its citizens. Indeed, it would
seem to be a government role that should be closely monitored by the
chief law enforcement officer of the state – the Attorney General.
Second, although private actions do not cost the state budget, our
analysis indicates that private actions tax consumers in the form of
higher prices – in effect, an excise tax to pay for “protection” that we
argue is actually harmful to consumers. Such a tax (if it could be
187

For general comments on the development of such regulation through
litigation, see W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation Through Litigation (2002) and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_through_litigation.
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indentified to consumers for what it is) is particularly offensive to many
consumers, policy analysts, and politicians because it is regressive.
Since consumers are already forced to pay for the private enforcement of
the state CPAs, it would be much more straightforward and transparent
to dispense with the private actions and then let the taxpayers decide
whether they are willing to pay for increased public enforcement with
higher taxes.
Our proposal to do away with private enforcement is unlikely to
generate significant political attraction. No doubt, many consumer
protection groups would view it as an assault on consumer welfare. On
the other hand, a crusading attorney general could make the argument
that consumer protection is too important to be left to disorganized
litigation. Regardless, we believe that a few more modest and politically
palatable reforms would dramatically improve the impact of CPAs on
consumer welfare.
A. Different Rules for Class Actions versus Individual Actions
Our analysis clearly demonstrates that the consumer class action
by itself solves one of the fundamental economic problems that CPAs
were intended to correct: the economic infeasibility of private lawsuits
where the individual consumer suffers only small harm from seller
deception but aggregate consumer harm is large Once a putative class
has been formed, all the other provisions of CPAs are unnecessary and,
indeed, potentially harmful to consumers. This suggests that courts and
legislatures should have one set of rules for individual consumer actions
and another set of rules for consumer class actions under CPAs.
Specifically, the traditional common law protections of requiring
reasonable reliance, causation, and injury should be restored to consumer
class actions. Statutory damages, damage multipliers, and punitive
damages are not necessary for consumer class actions to solve the basic
economic problem addressed by CPAs.
B. Class Actions Should Meet a Consumer Welfare Standard
The private attorney general rhetoric about attorney fee
provisions of CPAs suggests that private attorneys should be held to a
standard that assures that their actions are, in fact, in the public
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interest. 188 This point is relevant to both individual consumer actions
and consumer class actions.
For example, even a relatively
inconsequential individual action under a CPA can send important
signals to mass marketers that may result in behavior that does not
benefit all consumers. A requirement that all actions under CPAs serve
the public interest can be implemented through a consumer welfare
standard.
An important and significant means to rationalize consumer class
actions would be for state legislatures or state courts to require that
consumer class action attorneys allege as part of the class certification
process that certification of the class and recovery by the class would in
fact promote consumer welfare. The court could hold pre-trial hearings
on the consumer welfare standard and whether success by the class
attorney is reasonably likely to help consumers, in general. This would
be a particularly important safeguard because the certification of a large
class action often forces defendants to settle even when they believe that
they would likely prevail at trial.
At a common sense level, it seems obvious that CPAs should be
interpreted to promote consumer welfare. The FTC’s consumer
protection mandate is now interpreted to be the promotion of consumer
welfare. In some states, the CPAs explicitly instruct judges to consider
and give weight to FTC precedent. 189 In fact, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho and
Tennessee, among others, require direct consistency with federal
precedent. 190 And even without explicit mandate, many state courts will
often defer to FTC precedent in construing the language of their CPA
statutes. 191 Finally, some CPAs create private rights of action against
violations of the separate antitrust laws in that state (sometimes referred
to as “mini-Sherman” or “mini-Clayton” Acts), which can allow more
direct adherence to the standard of promoting consumer welfare by
prohibiting anti-competitive practices. 192 However, numerous judicial
interpretations have opened the door to actions that may harm consumer
188
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welfare. The so-called “no loss” cases provide a perfect example of the
type of action that would not be allowed under a consumer welfare
standard. If a loss is so remote or so difficult to prove, perhaps it should
not be actionable.
The current state of judicial interpretations may be a classic
example of the law of unintended consequences. The judges may simply
be carrying out what they perceive as the legislative intent. However,
the multifaceted penalties in CPAs suggest that a better approach would
be for the judges to be constrained by requiring the plaintiffs to make a
credible story of how the action would promote the consumer welfare –
beyond simply alleging that it is a violation of the public policy as
reflected in the relevant CPA. 193
C. State Court Reliance on FTC Interpretations of Unfair and
Deceptive Practices
The FTC’s expertise in consumer protection far exceeds what can
be expected of state courts. As discussed above, the FTC’s definitions of
unfair and deceptive practices reflect a consumer welfare standard and
the balancing of costs and benefits of intervention that is simply not a
part of the typical consumer action – individual or class – under state
CPAs. It is logical and reasonable for state courts to rely on the
expertise and experience of the FTC in consumer protection matters.
First, the FTC actually played an active role in encouraging the adoption
of the “Little FTC Acts.” The FTC helped create this leviathan, so
perhaps it should help solve the problem. Second, state courts initially
deferred to FTC interpretations, 194 but recent applications under CPAs
have strayed far from that original relationship. Indeed, it is clear that
193

If actual damages are greater than statutory damages, then the presumption
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many actions under CPAs would not be entertained by the FTC. Third,
the FTC has developed a great deal of expertise in consumer protection
and brings thousands of consumer protection complaints every year. If a
complaint would not be pursued by the FTC, then a similar complaint
should not move forward in state court. Fourth, in general, neither state
agencies nor state courts have developed the expertise to analyze
consumer protection issues.
For all of these reasons, state legislatures and state courts should
require the application of the FTC’s definitions of unfair and deceptive
practices in all cases alleging the existence of such practices. The
currently ad hoc and highly uncertain state court interpretations of what
constitutes “unfair” or “deceptive” seller communications almost surely
deter some valuable and informative seller speech. Either by state
legislation or judicial interpretation, a safe harbor from state CPA
liability should be created for seller statements that comply with the
FTC’s considered regulatory definitions of “unfair” and “deceptive”
practices.
D. Proactive FTC Intervention in Consumer Class Actions Filed
Under State CPAs
The FTC consumer protection function logically extends to
attempting to influence private litigation that threatens to harm consumer
welfare. A proactive role by the FTC would be for the Bureau of
Consumer Protection to file amicus briefs with its staff’s analysis of the
likely impact of the case on consumer welfare. Another approach would
be for the FTC, possibility at the suggestion of the judge hearing the
case, 195 to file a simple statement that similar practices have been
investigated by the FTC and deemed to not contradict the FTC standards
for unfair and deceptive.
E. In Class Action CPA Litigation, Punitive Damages Should be a
Rare Exception, Awarded Only When there is a Low Probability of
Detection and Liability
The availability of the class action procedural device overcomes
the problem of inadequate individual incentives to seek relief for false or
195
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deceptive seller practices and also provides very strong incentives for
plaintiffs’ attorneys to discover and then pursue claims against sellers
who have engaged in false or deceptive practices. The attorneys fee
incentive in pursuing class litigation gives plaintiffs’ attorney a very
strong incentive to monitor and investigate seller communications. For
this reason, the class action device itself increases the probability that
false and deceptive seller practices are detected and trigger liability.
While the probability of detection and liability may rarely be equal to
one, in class action CPA litigation, it will generally be sufficiently high
that punitive damages are not necessary for optimal deterrence. When
punitive damages are awarded, the multiplier should rarely exceed one.
F. Regulatory Compliance Defense
When a business has complied with state regulatory mandates,
compliance with such standards should be an absolute defense to private
CPA actions under that state’s law. Yale Law Professor Alan Schwartz
has argued that such compliance should exculpate compliant firms as a
matter of law. 196 The “regulatory compliance defense” – which is also
called the “regulatory standards defense” 197 – would allow
manufacturers and service providers a reasonable degree of certainty in
acts and practices. One implication of the regulatory compliance defense
is that courts court put a quick end to cases such as Avery v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company where State Farm was hit with a billion
dollar punitive damages judgment for using generic replacement parts
when the state insurance regulations encouraged them to use such parts
to save money for policy holders. 198 Moreover, it seems totally
reasonable to insulate businesses from punitive damages awards when
they comply with relevant regulations.
Adoption of these modest proposals would be major steps toward
reducing the corrosive effect of private actions under state CPAs. Many
of these steps are consistent with what Victor Schwartz and Cary
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Silverman call “common sense interpretation” of the statutes. 199
V. CONCLUSION
Just as unintended consequences resulted from the states’ desires
to empower consumers, any reform of state CPAs will equally need to be
cognizant of reaching beyond the policy objectives of restoring balance
to this area of the law. The framework developed in this article
demonstrates that a relatively simple and straightforward set of policy
reforms can make state CPAs a valuable tool for deterring socially
harmful false and misleading seller practices while preventing the threat
of massive CPA liability from chilling the communication of socially
valuable product information. These reforms recognize the deterrent
power of class actions lawsuits, but discipline such suits by looking to
federal regulatory standards for the substantive regulatory standard and
by eschewing procedural devices (such as attorney’s fees and damage
multipliers) that the class action makes unnecessary. Properly reformed
state CPA’s can advance the interests of both consumers and sellers in
providing information to and driving fraud from consumer markets.
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APPENDIX. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER
STATE CPAs
We are interested in how three crucial procedural institutions –
the class action, attorneys fees and damage multipliers – interact to
determine both the incentive for a plaintiff and plantiff’s attorney to file
suit, and also the expected sanction. Our basic point is this: to overcome
the lack of plaintiff incentives to sue under the common law, CPAs
adopted attorney’s fee shifting provisions and damage multipliers. But
especially when put together with the class action, these innovations
have created a very strong incentive for plaintiff attorneys to bring
lawsuits. CPAs have generated such high expected damages faced by
defendants that unless CPA liability arises only when defendants
engaged in clearly egregiously careless product design or marketing
choices, CPAs will cause defendants to refrain from marketing socially
desirable products and from advertising as fully as they should those
products that they do market.
1. Clarifying the Economic Rationale for Attorney Fee Shifting
and Damage Multipliers: The Defendant’s Incentives
We begin with the defendant’s incentives. These are a function
of: the sanction that the defendant expects to pay in the event that it is
sued, which we call D; the cost to the defendant of taking actions that
lower its risk of having to pay the sanction, which we denote by x (equal
also to the level of precautions with normalized per unit cost of 1) and
three probabilities: that harm occurs, which we denote by h; that it is
sued given that harm occurs, which we denote by s; and the probability
that it has to pay the sanction D if sued, which we denote by q. Consider
a simple case where the defendant is risk neutral, and either takes the
action and reduces its probability of harm and suit to zero, or does not
take the action. In this case, the defendant’s choice is:
min {hsqD, x}.
(1)
Now if the social goal is to have the defendant take the costly
action if and only if the expected harm thereby averted is greater than the
cost x, then what we would like the defendant to choose is:
min {hH, x},
(2)
where H is the actual magnitude of harm. Comparing (1) and (2), we can
see that whenever the probability of suit and probability of being
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sanctioned when sued are less than one, or when damages are set equal
to the actual harm (D = H) then the defendant perceives too low a benefit
from taking the costly, harm-averting action. Under these assumptions,
hH > hsqH.
But suppose that we set damages not equal to actual harm, but at
whatever level is necessary to equate the defendant’s expected benefit
from the costly action – eliminating expected liability in the amount
hsqD – to the expected social benefit from the costly action – eliminating
the expected social harm hH. Equating these two means setting:
hsqD = hH, or simplifying and solving for D, we have that:
D = H/sq.
(3)
Equation (3) gives the basic economic rationale for punitive
damages. 200 Whenever the probability of suit and sanction are less than
one, a rational, cost minimizing defendant will have too weak an
incentive to take costly harm-averting action. To equate the social and
private benefit of taking care, the optimal sanction must be multiplied up
by a multiplier that equals the inverse of the probability of suit times the
probability of liability. For example, if the probability of suit is .5, then
even if the probability of paying damages D when sued is very high, say
.9, damages must be set equal to H/(.9)(.5) or roughly 2.2 times H in
order to restore optimal incentives.
Of course, by the same token, if damages are set too high relative
to the probability of suit and liability, then a potential defendant will
behave as if the social harm from her activity is much greater than it
actually is. If, for example, we presume as just before that the optimal
multiplier is 2.2, but punitive damages are set equal to, say, 9 times
200
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actual harm, then the defendant will invest far more to lower the
probability of liability than is socially optimal to reduce just the
probability of harm.
There is, however, an important qualification to equation (3), one
that in fact explains why American law generally awards punitive
damages against a defendant only if the plaintiff can show a very high
degree of defendant fault. Equation (3) essentially assumes that q, the
probability of sanction given suit, is less than one only because
sometimes careless or faulty defendants somehow escape liability. But
this is of course only part of the story. A defendant’s behavior may be
reasonably careful, and yet the defendant may face a positive risk of
liability q even when it in fact did nothing wrong. If the law routinely
awarded punitive damages according to the formula in (3), then punitive
damages would be higher, the lower is the probability that the defendant
will be found liable for such damages. Assuming that the legal process
is imperfect but nonetheless rational, a lower probability of liability for
punitive damages means that the defendant’s behavior was less, rather
than more, culpable. Optimal incentives require that liability falls as
culpability falls, not the opposite.
On the economic model of deterrence, it is indeed precisely
because of the risk of such error that American law does not allow
punitive damages to be assessed against a defendant unless the jury finds
that the defendant was greatly at fault. For if a defendant is found to
have been “grossly negligent” or to have acted with “reckless disregard,”
then ordinary liability (q above) is likely to have been extremely high,
approaching 1, and we need have no fear that punitive liability is being
incorrectly imposed. Hence in the cases in which punitive liability is
actually imposed – those with a very high probability q of ordinary
liability – the formula in (3) simplifies to:
(4)
D = H/s ≡ mH,
where we define m ≡ 1/s. Equation (4) says that the optimal multiplier
for punitive damages is equal to 1 divided by the probability of suit. The
minor transgressions that often provide the basis for suit under CPAs are
inherently a lower probability of detection and suit, but the de minimus
nature of the damages suggests that the imposition of punitive damages
should always require an analysis of the defendant’s fault.
2. The Plaintiff’s Side: Attorneys Fees, Damage Multipliers and
the Plaintiff’s Incentive to Sue
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The previous section assumed a particular probability of suit.
But the plaintiff’s incentive to bring suit is determined by three things,
which together give us the plaintiff’s expected payout from filing suit:
the amount of money that the plaintiff expects to get, whether from a
jury or by settlement, an amount we shall denote as above by D > 0; the
attorneys fees and other costs that the plaintiff must incur to get that
payout, an amount that we shall denote by c > 0; and, finally, the
probability (as perceived by the plaintiff) that she will in fact get the
payout D, which we denote as above by q.
As our focus is not on issues relating to risk and uncertainty, we
shall assume that consumers are risk neutral with respect to the decision
whether or not to bring suit. We shall also assume away agency cost
problems, and presume that the consumer controls the level of effort and
hence cost of any lawsuit that she were to bring, so that costs are
optimally chosen, given the probability of success in a particular type of
claim and possible payout. 201 This means that consumers value their
risky right to bring suit by its expected value, net of the cost of suit.
Assuming that plaintiffs are economically motivated and rational in a
very basic sense – in that they will undertake suit only if they perceive
that suit has a positive net expected value – an injured consumer will
bring suit if and only if her expected payout is bigger than her expected
cost. Using the notation just defined, the consumer will bring suit if and
only if:
qD ≥ c, or,
q ≥ c/D =qT.
(5)
Inequality (5) defines a threshold probability of success in getting
a payout from suing, qT, below which the plaintiff expects a negative net
expected return from suing and therefore will not sue. From (5), we can
see that this threshold probability qT is higher – and suit less likely to be
in the plaintiff’s interest – the higher are the plaintiff’s costs c and the
lower is the plaintiff’s expected payout D. In the classic consumer
deception case that CPAs were intended to address, any individual
plaintiff suffers only very small, economic harm and therefore expects a
201
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small payout D, so small that such a plaintiff would not find a lawsuit to
be worthwhile, even if c, her cost of suit, is small. In addition, as we
discussed earlier, the traditional common law tort elements together
worked to create a relatively low probability that the plaintiff would
prevail at trial and hence also (for reasons we shall come to
momentarily) a small probability q that the plaintiff would get a payout
either from settlement or a trial award. With no one to bring suit, ex post
legal sanctions have no deterrent effect, and we have precisely the
underdeterrence problem that CPAs were designed to address.
With the help of Figure 1 below, we can make these points more
precise, and pave the way for analysis of the procedural changes
introduced by CPAs. Figure 1 graphs a mass marketer’s perceived
probability of liability: its probability of being sued for unfair trade
practices and having to pay the amount D in damages. This probability
is given by g, and it is equal to the probability of being sued, which we
will denote by s, multiplied by the probability of being found liable for
damages in the amount D, which as above is given by q. What we have
just shown is that for q <qT, the probability of suit, s, and hence also the
probability of liability (given by g = qs) is 0. Figure 1depicts a simple
case in which for q ≥ qT, we have g = q (suit is always brought once it is
economically viable, and so the probability of having to pay D is simply
given by q).
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The procedural innovations made by CPAs – attorneys fees and
various damage enhancers – affect the incentives depicted in Figure 1 on
both the cost side and payout side. On the cost side, assuming that
attorneys’ fees that are paid when the plaintiff is successful in getting a
payout (either in the form of settlement or a trial award) and fully cover
the plaintiff’s costs, the attorney’s fee provisions of CPAs lower the
plaintiff’s expected cost of bringing a lawsuit from c to (1-q)c. Punitive
damages, with damages equal to a multiple m of compensatory damages
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D, a common feature of CPAs, would of course increase the plaintiff’s
payout from D to m(m+1)D. With these two changes, plaintiffs will now
find suit worthwhile whenever: 202
q > c / ((m+1)D + c) ≡ qTcpa.
(6)
Comparing (5) and (6), we see that when a CPA allows for the
recovery of attorneys fee and treble damages, the threshold success
probability for which plaintiffs will file suit falls by a factor of 1/(m +1+
c/D) or – since the underdeterrence problem is most severe when c > D –
by at least a factor of 1/(m+2). (Recall that m > 1). As depicted by
Figure 2, the procedural innovations of attorney fee shifting and treble
damages greatly increase the range of claims that are individually
rational for a plaintiff to bring.
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In the more complete model, with plaintiff effort affecting both the probability
of success and the magnitude of the payout, the optimal effort level would change
under a CPA. And because the CPA both lowers the plaintiff’s expected cost and
increases the plaintiff’s return, the plaintiff would generally choose a higher level of
effort – that is, cost – under the CPA than under the common law. However, for any
level of cost, the plaintiff gets a higher expected return under the CPA, and so the
threshold probability would move in a model with cost endogenous as it does in our
text and Figures.
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By looking back at inequality (6), we can see inherent limitations
on the effect of attorney’s fees plus treble damages in a typical consumer
action. The impact of these procedural innovations is limited by the
relationship between the cost of suit and the actual damages D suffered
by the plaintiff. If the damages are very slight relative to the cost of suit,
then the threshold probability for suit to be viable will remain high even
under a CPA that awards attorneys fees and punitive damages. 203 With
very small individual damages, then even if successful plaintiffs get their
attorney’s fees back and get treble damages, individual plaintiffs will
have an incentive to bring suit only in cases that are virtually sure
winners (that is, for q → 1). Similarly, statutory damages of, say,
$2,500 per claim, may not solve the incentive problem.
To see this most clearly, consider the limiting case, when D → 0. In this case,
as can be seen from inequality (2), the threshold probability even under treble damages
remains very close to 1.
203
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Thus, in our model, the procedural innovations of CPAs –
attorneys fees, costs, and enhanced damages – by themselves fail to
solve the economic problem of individual actions with small amounts at
stake. On the other hand, the substantive changes brought about by
CPAs – e.g., relaxation of traditional common law requirements of
reliance, causation and injury – greatly increase the likelihood of success
by plaintiffs. Arguably, this is precisely what CPAs were intended to
accomplish – help solve the incentive problems of plaintiffs with
relatively small claims. However, as shown in the following section,
these salutary effects in the individual consumer cases of CPAs’
procedural and substantive innovations have a perverse effect when
combined with class actions. Indeed, the logic of extending the
procedural and substantive innovations that were intended to help
individual consumers achieve redress to large classes is flawed.
3. Adding the Class Action to the CPA Equation
(a) Class Actions versus Individual Common Law Actions
The class action procedural device allows the aggregation of
small claims across the entire set of consumers who have purchased an
allegedly deceptively marketed product. Under the class action, what
matters are not the incentives of an individual consumer to bring suit, but
rather the incentives of the attorney for the class. Under a CPA with
class actions, the attorney’s payout differs from the individual plaintiff
we have considered thus far in that the attorney gets a payout which is
generally an increasing function of the payout to the entire class that she
represents. With n class identical class members, the class payout is
given by nD, where D as before represents individual damages, of which
we may assume that the attorney gets a judicially-determined share r.
The attorney’s fee provision of CPAs also ensures that regardless of the
size of the class or the class members’ individual damages, the attorney
gets at least her actual fees incurred when she succeeds in obtaining a
payout (whether by settlement or trial award). Hence in the event of
success, a CPA class action attorney’s payout is max {rnD, c}. Hence a
class action attorney’s expected payout is given by:
max q [max(rnD,c)] – c.
(7)
A quick look at (7) shows that if the most that a class action attorney
could hope for in the event of success was to get back her fees, c, then
she would have no incentive to pursue the action, no matter how likely,
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because her expected payout would be less than or equal to zero. 204
In general, the attorney expects a payout that is a share of the
class damages (that is, max {rnD,c} = rnD). In this case, the attorney
pursues the class action if and only if:
qrnD – c > 0, or if
q > c/rnD.
(8)
Comparing (8) to (5), we see the threshold probability of success
at which a class action lawsuit is viable for an individual attorney is
lower than the threshold probability for an individual common law
plaintiff whenever it is true that:
rnD > D, or if
r > 1/n.
(9)
What inequality (9) says is that the larger the number of plaintiffs
in the class (on behalf of each of whom, the attorney recovers an amount
D), the lower is the attorney’s share of the payout sufficient to ensure
that the class action will enhance the viability of suit relative to
individual common law actions. For a very large class (n large), even
for a relatively low share of the payout, class action attorneys will find it
worthwhile to file a large range of low probability of success lawsuits
that an individual plaintiff would not file. For example, even for a very
small class action of only 10 plaintiffs, the attorney’s payout from filing
will be higher than the individual plaintiffs’ whenever the attorney
expects to get a share of the payout that is bigger than or equal to 10
percent.
For a more typical large class of 10,000 plaintiffs, the
attorney’s expected payout will be bigger than that of the individual class
members whenever that attorney expects to get more than .0001 share of
the class payout. Hence for any reasonably large class action, the
attorney’s expected payout will be higher than what the individual
plaintiffs would have expected, and so significantly more lawsuits will
be brought simply as a consequence of the class action procedural
device.
(b) Class Actions, CPAs and Overdeterrence
204

The only exception to this would be an attorney who would otherwise be
unemployed, for such an attorney would perceive an opportunity cost less than her
hourly fees – that is, she would get an hourly-based amount c if successful but her
actual cost of pursuing the action would only be some fraction of her actual hourly rate
(if she were certain to be otherwise unemployed, it would equal only the unemployment
compensation amount, if any). Our exposition in the accompanying text is presumably
the more general situation.
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Under very general circumstances, the class action will make
unnecessary the enhanced damage provisions of CPAs. The reason is
that when both procedural devices exist – that is, CPA class actions – the
threshold probability of success for suits to be brought will be even
lower than with CPAs or class actions alone. Even more importantly, in
terms of the deterrence effect, class actions and punitive damages are
completely duplicative: they both essentially give the plaintiff’s attorney
the right to enforce against the defendant a large multiple of any
individual plaintiff’s damages. Therefore punitive damage multiples that
essentially assume that there is no class action will be higher than the
level that is necessary to optimally deter defendant’s from socially
harmful behavior.
The CPA class action with punitive damages is one in which the
class action attorney gets her fees plus a share of the class payout when
she is successful in obtaining such a payout, while bearing her own fees
(her opportunity cost of bringing a CPA suit) when unsuccessful. Under
such a regime, the threshold probability of suit becomes:
q>

c
≡ qT ' .
mrnD + c

(10)

Comparing inequality (10) with inequalities (6) – (8), we can see how
CPA class actions generate the lowest threshold success probability suits
to be viable. This threshold probability falls, the bigger is the punitive
damage multiplier m. Were we to place the threshold qT’ in Figure 6[No
Figure 6. Figure 2?], it would lie quite far to the left of qTcpa.
What class actions CPAs with punitive damages do is to
effectively give the plaintiff’s attorney the right to enforce the rights of
mrn individual plaintiff (where, to recall, m is the punitive damage
multiplier, n is the number of plaintiffs in the class, and r is the
attorney’s share of the award.) Especially for large class actions of say
10,000 or more, even if the plaintiff attorney gets only 25 percent of the
recovery (r = .25), the class action alone gives the attorney a very large
expected recovery. Multiplying this recovery by the punitive damage
multiple m further enhances the attorney’s expected payout. All of these
devices together create such a large expected payout for attorneys that
they have an incentive to sue even if the probability of receiving a
recovery (which we denoted earlier by q) is low. Because of this large
expected payout, the combined effect of class action representation with
attorneys fees and punitive damages – the CPA procedural package – is
to drive the probability of suit (denoted as above by s) close to 1 even for
suits with a low probability of success.
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Now recall from our earlier discussion that on optimal deterrence
grounds, the punitive damage multiplier m should equal 1/s. If, as just
argued, CPA class actions offer such a large reward to plaintiffs’
attorneys that s approaches 1, then it might seem that there should be no
punitive damage multiplier: that is, s = 1 implies that m = 1. But this is
a bit too simple, because as we have just seen from (10), it is the
interaction of m, the punitive damage multiplier; n, the size of the class,
and r, the attorney’s share of the class recovery, that determines a
plaintiff attorney’s expected reward, incentive to sue and hence s. The
general lesson from (10) is more complex but also more important:
The larger is the size of the class in a CPA class action and the
higher is attorney’s share of the class recovery, the higher the
probability of suit, and the less need there is for damage enhancements
(statutory damages, double or treble damages, or punitive damages) in
class action CPAs.
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